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INTRODUCTION
The test should not be whether he or his parents have the ability to
finance his education. The test should be whether he has the brain-
power and the desire to go ahead and better himself and make him-
self a better person.1
Without access to credit, tens of thousands of aspiring college,
graduate, and professional school students would be unable to finance
their education.2 Finding a way to pay for college has become as much
of a challenge for some students as scoring well enough on exams like
the SAT to gain admission in the first place. The amounts students
borrow have increased too, as have the debt burdens students carry at
graduation.
Congress has taken steps to set student loans apart from other
consumer loans. For example, lawmakers have given education loans
1. 111 CONG. REC. 22,704 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hartke). In 1965, Senator
Rupert Vance Hartke, an Indiana Democrat who served in the Senate from 1959 to
1977, sought to raise the maximum amounts students could borrow through the fed-
eral student loan program, which was included in the Higher Education Act passed
later that year. He feared that an “economic test”—that is, a test of aspiring college
students’ ability to find a way to pay for their education—would become an ever
greater obstacle to higher education as rising prices made paying for college more
challenging.
2. According to the College Board, in the 2008–09 academic year, half of full-
time undergraduate students took out a federal loan to help pay for college. COLLEGE
BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2 (2009), http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/
archives/SA_2009.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2009]. Graduate and un-
dergraduate students borrowed more than $95 billion from various sources to help pay
for higher education. Id. at 6. That figure does not include other types of loans, like
home equity loans taken out by parents to help pay for their children’s education.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\14-1dr\nyl102.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-MAR-11 14:54
2011] THE OTHER BIG TEST 13
special treatment in bankruptcy proceedings,3 made repayment tax de-
ductible,4 and set the terms of loans made or guaranteed by the federal
government.5
For various reasons, lawmakers may view education loans as dis-
tinct from other types of debt. Higher education generates unique re-
turns. It produces a citizenry better able to make enlightened
judgments and resist tyranny,6 and it develops wiser leaders. To pro-
mote education and generate these benefits, the government has inter-
vened in credit markets, making student loans widely available.
Unfortunately, the amount of money available through federal pro-
grams has not kept pace with college costs.7 As a result, the govern-
ment’s effort to promote access to higher education has been
inadequate. The limited nature of the federal aid effort undermines the
goals aid programs try to achieve.
Lawmakers’ modifications of the law governing federal aid have
not made it possible for students to finance their higher education
drawing solely on federal loan sources. As a result, a crisis is brewing
in financial aid. The victims are student borrowers who must delay
3. The Bankruptcy Code imposes a test borrowers must meet to discharge their
obligations. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the “undue hard- R
ship” standard borrowers must meet in seeking to discharge student loans). See also
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (2006) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2006))
(permitting a debtor to discharge an educational loan if the loan “would impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents”). For a full discussion of
how this provision operates, see Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Stu-
dent Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179
(2009).
4. “[T]here is a special deduction allowed for paying interest on a student loan.”
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Publication 970: Tax Benefits for Education, ch. 5
(Student Loan Interest Deduction), http://www.irs.gov/publications/p970/index.html.
The deduction is means-tested, however. Id.
5. Mark Kantrowitz, Student Loans: Overview, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/info/student-loans/.
6. See Thomas Jefferson, Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge (1778), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 526–27 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1950).
7. Since 1981, average tuition and fees at nonprofit, private colleges and universi-
ties more than doubled, from $14,747 to $36,993 in the 2010–11 academic year; at
public four-year colleges, tuition, fees, room and board rose from $6,725 to $16,140.
COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING: FIGURES AND TABLES 13 fig.5
(2010), http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/2010_Trends_College_Pricing_All_
Figures_Tables.xls [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING] . Over the same time
period, even though the maximum amount undergraduate students can borrow through
the federal Stafford loan program has roughly quadrupled, rising from $7,500 to
$31,000, the total amount does not cover college costs. Mark Kantrowitz, Historical
Loan Limits, FINAID.ORG, http://www.finaid.org/loans/historicallimits.phtml (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2010).
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their life plans, give up on attending college, or abandon career aspira-
tions, all because of debt. For example, Paula Clifford could afford to
spend five years as a prosecutor in Boston only by keeping her college
bartending job; she then had to move to a law firm to make ends
meet.8 Garrett Mockler, a teacher, dancer, and choreographer in Los
Angeles, had to file for bankruptcy protection because he could not
afford his student loans.9
For increasing numbers of students, the education financing prob-
lem is the result of reliance on consumer education loans outside of
federal programs to fill the gap between college costs and available
aid. This gap has created an opportunity for financial institutions to
lend to students. Lending to students has been a profitable and conse-
quently attractive business. For example, the student loan provider
SLM Corporation—commonly known as Sallie Mae—reported profits
in 2009 of $324 million; a few years earlier, before the financial crisis
of 2008, its profits exceeded $1 billion.10 The drive to grow lending
operations led some loan companies to engage in dubious marketing
practices to lure borrowers. Such schemes became public in 2007 in a
series of scandals that illustrated the potential conflict between the
interests of lenders and students.11 Handed an opportunity to modify
the law governing the financial aid system, Congress attempted to rein
in abuses and improve loan disclosure requirements through legisla-
tion.12 In 2010, with the Obama administration’s support, federal
lawmakers approved the termination of a decades-old program that
guaranteed federal loans made by private companies.13 But Congress
did not significantly increase the amount students could borrow
8. Jonathan D. Glater, High Tuition Debts and Low Pay Drain Public Interest
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A1.
9. Jonathan D. Glater, That Student Loan, So Hard to Shake, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2008, at BU1.
10. SLM Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.
salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/A0450B59-A4A0-4586-9B4C-253FF335008B/12210/
BOW76911BOW024_BITS_N_1548.pdf [hereinafter SLM Corp. 2009 Annual
Report].
11. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Cuomo Investigates Colleges And Ties to Student
Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at B6; Robert Tomsho, U.S. Would Take Over
Federal Student Loans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A10; How the Student-Loan
Inquiry Has Unfolded, USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2007, 11:34 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/money/industries/banking/2007-04-24-loan-timeline-usat_N.htm.
12. See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 434, 122 Stat.
3078, 3247 (2008) (requiring disclosure of loan terms to prospective student borrow-
ers); id. § 436(c) (making lenders that offer certain incentives to colleges ineligible
for participation in federal student loan programs).
13. Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A14.
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through federal loan programs; as a result, new legislation did not
make it easier for students to pay for college without recourse to loans
outside of the federal aid system.
This article contends that Congress should further overhaul the
federal aid system. My proposal does not seek to eliminate the role of
debt in paying for college; I accept the persistence of student loans.
Instead, I argue that federal aid programs should provide loans to stu-
dents that pay all of the costs of college—an argument not for more
indebtedness but for use of a different type of debt, recognizing that
different types of debt are not equally bad and that debt can be a tool
to make possible graduates’ decisions to serve the greater good.
Before proceeding, I will define a few terms. The variety of pro-
grams providing loans to students and their families has generated a
confusing lexicon. For the sake of clarity, I will describe loans made
by private lenders, such as banks, and guaranteed by the federal gov-
ernment under the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP)14 as “guaranteed loans,” loans made directly to students by
the federal government, as “direct loans,” and loans made by private
lenders outside FFELP as “private loans.” By “federal loans,” I refer
to both guaranteed and direct loans. The best-known federal loans are
Stafford loans. Larger loan amounts are available through PLUS
loans, which are available only to parents of undergraduate students
and to graduate and professional students. Until 2010, Stafford and
PLUS loans were available either directly from the government or
through a lender.15 The lenders that make private loans and guaranteed
loans are “private lenders,” even though they may be publicly traded
companies, like Sallie Mae and Citigroup, or non-profit, state-related
entities like the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority.
Raising the maximum amount students can borrow through fed-
eral programs would have a far-reaching and beneficial impact on stu-
dents and families. If students could finance college exclusively with
federal loans, they could manage their debt more easily because fed-
14. The Federal Family Education Loan Program is what Congress voted to shut
down. See id.
15. PLUS loans carry higher maximum loan amounts than Stafford loans. Parents
can borrow up to the full cost of attendance, and graduate or professional students can
borrow up to $138,500. Applying for Direct Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://
www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DirectLoan/applying.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
The 2010 budget proposed by the Obama administration and approved by Congress
eliminated the guaranteed loan program as of July 1, 2010. See Baker & Herszenhorn,
supra note 13; see also David M. Herszenhorn & Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Over- R
haul Approved by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A16 (reporting on elimi-
nation of the guaranteed loan program as part of health care legislation).
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eral aid programs already offer borrowers flexible repayment terms,
including the ability to make payments based on their income.16 Fed-
eral programs also make it possible for indebted graduates facing eco-
nomic hardship to defer payment.17 Federal programs also forgive
loans of graduates who pursue careers in the public interest.18 Offering
larger loan amounts through federal aid programs would be another
step toward eventual elimination of a role in the financial aid system
for private loan companies, which seek to profit from, rather than to
promote, access to education.
Past proposals to assist students in paying for college focused on
expanding loan forgiveness programs,19 a step that some wealthy uni-
versities, states, and the federal government have already taken.20
However, these programs, along with proposed enhanced forgiveness
programs, do not cover loans made outside of the federal system.21
This article contends that, if we accept at face value the norma-
tive claim that widespread higher education benefits and protects de-
mocracy, and that the government’s efforts to promote access to
higher education are appropriate, then we should also endorse more
16. Repayment Plans and Calculators, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.
gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/OtherFormsOfRepay.jsp#IBR (last visited
Oct. 4, 2010).
17. Postponing Repayment, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/POR-
TALSWebApp/students/english/difficulty.jsp (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
18. Public Service Loan Forgiveness, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.
gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/PSF.jsp (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
19. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren et al., Service Pays: Creating Opportunities by
Linking College with Public Service, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 131–36 (2007)
(calling for expansion and enhancement of loan forgiveness for graduates who go into
public service careers).
20. See, e.g., COAP (Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP)), YALE LAW
SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/COAP.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2010); HKS
Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP), HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, http://
www.hks.harvard.edu/degrees/sfs/resources/lrap (last visited Oct. 4, 2010); Nursing
Student Loan Forgiveness Program (NSLFP), FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.
doh.state.fl.us/phnursing/NLF/NSLFP.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2010); Student Loan
Forgiveness for Teachers, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, http://www.tea.state.tx.us/loan.aspx
(last visited Oct. 4, 2010); see also Public Service Loan Forgiveness, supra note 18 R
and accompanying text (describing federal loan forgiveness programs).
21. In 2009, Senator Sherrod Brown introduced legislation that would allow stu-
dents who borrow independently of any federal program to swap their student loans
for federal loans at fixed rates. However, this swap would be available only to stu-
dents who did not borrow the maximum available amounts through federal programs.
Press Release, Office of Senator Sherrod Brown, Brown Announces Bill to Help
Americans with Costly Private Student Loan Debt (July 29, 2009), available at http://
brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press_releases/release/?id=4C941C07-3FC5-40A1-
ACC1-38ABDB23915C.
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complete government intervention in credit markets, in order to pre-
serve the public benefits flowing from the education of more students.
This article has three parts. The first part discusses the signifi-
cance of higher education in a democratic society and the challenge of
enabling students to attend college. It then analyzes the negative con-
sequences of the decision to employ student loans as the public policy
tool to promote access. The second part briefly summarizes the history
of federal loan programs in order to explain how the public policy
choice to use loans was made, discusses how the loan programs have
worked, and analyzes the most recent legislative changes to these pro-
grams. In the second part, I suggest that modifications enacted by
Congress fell short, in that the changes did not enable more students to
pay for college without recourse to private loans; lawmakers did not
raise sufficiently the amount of federal loan money available per stu-
dent. The third part argues for expansion of federal loan programs to
allow undergraduate students to borrow more than the government
currently permits. This part contends that, if operated in conjunction
with existing loan forgiveness and repayment assistance programs, a
program permitting students to borrow more through federal loan pro-
grams would better facilitate access to higher education overall and
would also bolster borrowers’ incentives to pursue public interest ca-
reers. By way of conclusion, I situate the need for student loan reform
in the broader context of increasing global competition to develop
talent.
I.
PRIVATE CREDIT ENLISTED FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
The government’s effort to help young people pay for college
reflects lawmakers’ deep—and probably widely shared—conviction
that higher education is at once a public and a private good, benefit-
ting both the community and the individual student. This section lays
out the normative framework underlying existing government efforts
to promote access to college, explains the ways in which debt finance
of higher education has undermined achievement of the government’s
goals, and then discusses existing programs that offer loan repayment
assistance and forgiveness.
A. A Bulwark of Democracy
[E]xperience hath shewn, that even under the best forms, those en-
trusted with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted
it into tyranny; and it is believed that the most effectual means of
preventing this would be, to illuminate, as far as practicable, the
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minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them
knowledge of those facts, which history exhibiteth, that, possessed
thereby of the experience of other ages and countries, they may be
enabled to know ambition under all its shapes, and prompt to exert
their natural powers to defeat its purposes.22
While Thomas Jefferson wrote of the critical role of education as
a bulwark against despotism, education also benefits people beyond
the student because others enjoy students’ inventions or guidance. For
individual students, access to education helps in realizing life ambi-
tions and may also lead to material rewards, as students capture the
benefit of the application of their trained intellects.
In the context of legal battles over who may gain access to insti-
tutions of higher learning, the Supreme Court has echoed the view that
education benefits people beyond the immediate student.23 But in the
analysis of the benefit of education, the Justices have often empha-
sized a slightly different public good: the importance of the college
experience in the education of future leaders.
Beyond enhancing the nation’s citizenry and its leaders, higher
education also serves as a means to individual prosperity. Countless
entrepreneurs and inventors have turned their learning to lucrative ad-
vantage in different marketplaces, developing new technologies and
new financial tools, for example.24 While for these financially suc-
cessful beneficiaries of higher education college was clearly a private
good, the fruits of their labors still benefit the many who use their
inventions or learn from their ideas.
Federal aid programs seek to achieve another societal goal be-
yond access to education. Through loan forgiveness programs,
lawmakers have attempted to encourage students to pursue careers in
the public interest because those jobs help to preserve shared public
values and order. Graduates who serve as firefighters, nurses, school-
22. Jefferson, supra note 6. R
23. For example, in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court struck down
university-enforced, racial isolation of a black student in a Ph.D. program in educa-
tion. In explaining the decision, Justice Fred M. Vinson lamented that the restrictions
on McLaurin “impair and inhibit his ability to engage in discussions and exchange
views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.” The Justice then
noted that “[o]ur society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders
increases correspondingly.” He concluded that McLaurin’s future “education and de-
velopment will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal to that of his
classmates.” McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
24. Consider, for example, the founders of the Internet search enterprise Google,
Sergey Brin and Larry Page, who met at Stanford University and worked on the
search engine now used by millions worldwide. Management Team, GOOGLE, http://
www.google.com/corporate/execs.html#sergey (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
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teachers, police officers, local prosecutors, public defense lawyers,
and in other roles can take advantage of these repayment assistance
and forgiveness programs. Through their service to the “instruction,
the trusts and government of society,”25 they are the vital supporters
of the republic that Jefferson envisioned. The combination of debt for-
giveness and financial aid seeks to enable access to education gener-
ally, and in addition, to enable people who have incurred debt to select
career paths that benefit society but that may not pay very well.
There is another reason the federal government may encourage
students to pursue public interest careers, beyond the benefit they pro-
vide to the rest of the community: enabling young people to achieve
their ambitions, to pursue careers that most appeal to them, to realize
themselves as fully as they can, is a good in itself. Even as they place
constraints on the borrower, loans permit a degree of independence, in
that they allow a student to pursue an education that would otherwise
be financially out of reach.
In the 1950s and 1960s, race- and ethnicity-based barriers to col-
lege admission were falling, as some of the nation’s oldest, most se-
lective universities shifted their admissions policies to focus on
students’ academic performance and/or other measures of merit.26 Le-
gal challenges forced other institutions to open their doors to young
people who would previously have been excluded because of their
race, ethnicity, religion, or socioeconomic status.27 The rhetoric of
merit and equality of opportunity operated in concert with and in favor
of wider access to higher education.28 “The main point of the Ameri-
25. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 9 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 424 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
26. See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE AND PRINCETON (2005). For example, under new
leadership in the 1960’s, the admissions office at Yale implemented a “radical reduc-
tion in preference for alumni sons and prep school boys, which opened up more
spaces for applicants from different backgrounds.” Id. at 364. Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton all were “radically transformed” in the decade between 1960 and 1970,
enrolling far more African American students than ever before. Id. at 379.
27. The Supreme Court has struck down legal barriers and university policies bar-
ring the admission of applicants from certain minority groups, for example. See, e.g.,
McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (striking down segre-
gation in the context of law school).
28. In recent years, admissions officers have found growing tension between the
goal of promoting access to education and the goal of recognizing academic achieve-
ment. See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates
of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 121 (2003) (discussing how
“flawed formulations of merit have failed to allocate scarce educational opportunities
in a manner that is consistent with democratic values”).
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can meritocracy was to marry the primary goal of elite selection to the
secondary one of mass opportunity.”29
Cost, however, remained a barrier to access. As students from
more diverse socioeconomic backgrounds pursue higher education,
and as tuition continues to rise, the question of how to help a growing
number of students afford college costs has become more pressing.
After all, many aspiring college students from groups previously dis-
criminated against lack the wealth to pay for higher education.30 Fi-
nancial aid can be an important tool in any effort to diversify college
classrooms along racial and/or ethnic lines.31
Congress addressed the challenge of designing a financial aid
system in the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The goal of HEA
was to promote access to higher education by making a limited
amount of loan money available to almost any student.32 In part be-
cause of the accessibility of funds, in the first forty-five years after
HEA was passed, the number of people enrolling in institutions of
higher learning soared.33
Neither Congress nor the states elected to allocate taxpayer dol-
lars to make higher education free, as it is in some countries, although
29. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
MERITOCRACY 280 (1999).
30. More than half of African-American and Hispanic households are in the bottom
forty percent of the income distribution, according to the Bureau of the Census. See
Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement, Table HINC-05. Percent Distribu-
tion of Households, by Selected Characteristics Within Income Quintile and Top 5
Percent in 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032009/hhinc/new05_000.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). As these statistics indicate,
when talking about enabling access to higher education for students of modest means,
race and/or ethnicity is an issue.
31. For example, in guidance to colleges on their consideration of race in admis-
sions decisions, the College Board observed that “recruitment, outreach, and retention
programs . . . can operate as key facets of enrollment management, very much related
to admissions and financial aid policies that have comparable (frequently overlapping)
aims.” Arthur L. Coleman et al., Federal Law and Recruitment, Outreach, and Reten-
tion: A Framework for Evaluating Diversity-Related Programs, COLLEGE BOARD 7–8
(2005), http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/diversitycollaborative/05di-
versity-fedlaw-framework.pdf.
32. On at least one occasion, Congress imposed a restriction on the availability of
federal student aid to those convicted of certain crimes involving illegal drugs. See
Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5051(i)(2)(C), 102 Stat.
4181, 4299 (1988).
33. According to the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education
Statistics, the number of students enrolled in degree-granting institutions rose to 18.2
million in 2007, more than double the number enrolled in 1970. The department
predicts that more than twenty million students will be enrolled in 2017. Fast Facts,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98 (last
visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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states have public universities that generally charge less than their pri-
vate counterparts. Lawmakers provided grants intended for the needi-
est students, but, recognizing the benefit of higher education to
graduates34 and the obstacle that rising tuition presented to middle
class, as well as poor, families,35 lawmakers chose to make loans
available to enable students to pay for college. The government im-
proved the availability of loans to students by guaranteeing borrowers’
obligations to companies that made the loans. Congress retained con-
trol of both borrowers’ interest rates and lenders’ rates of return on
these federal student loans.36 This structure linked the market for
higher education to the market for credit. Growth in the former was
aided by government intervention in the latter.
This strategy created a potential conflict between the govern-
ment’s interest in promoting college access and lenders’ interest in
earning profits.37 Indeed, student loan companies and the executives
who run them have fiduciary responsibilities to their stakeholders to
protect and grow their operations, which are more profitable the more
students borrow and the more interest they pay.
By offering the government guarantee of students’ obligations,
lawmakers sought to correct the failure of private credit markets to
provide loans on sufficiently favorable terms to enable more students
to attend college.38
34. Indeed, in the debate before passage of HEA, one senator proposed that student
loan borrowers repay based on a calculation of the “profit” they earned from their
degree. The proposal would have required comparing the salary of the degree-holding
borrower to the average salary of a person without a college degree and requiring the
college graduate to pay one-fourth of the difference. See infra note 119 and accompa- R
nying text.
35. In presenting HEA, Senator Winston Prouty emphasized lawmakers’ concern
over the challenge that the cost of higher education posed to the middle class.
“[C]ollege costs represent a real problem for middle income families,” the senator
said. 111 CONG. REC. 22,702 (1965) (statement of Sen. Prouty).
36. See, e.g., College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84,
§ 201, 121 Stat. 784, 790–91 (2007), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/toGPObss/http://fr
webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=
F:publ084.110.pdf (setting interest rates for federal student loans).
37. See Accountability for the Department of Education’s Oversight of Student
Loans and the Reading First Program: Hearing before the H. Comm. On Educ. and
Labor, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of George Miller, Chairman, H. Comm. On
Educ. and Labor), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/statements/051007GMHear-
ingStatement.pdf (describing a variety of practices by lenders that led students and
families to take out loans with excessive terms and concluding that “these practices
come at the expense of students and their families”).
38. Congress did not take the same approach to home loans, although home owner-
ship is another goal that the government has addressed by enhancing availability of
credit: government-sponsored enterprises purchase home loans from lenders, reducing
risk of default to the companies that extend home loans, and the interest on home
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The government’s intervention in the market for student loans
was neither complete nor all-encompassing. The system created to dis-
tribute aid did not permit students to borrow as much as they might
need.39 As a result, more borrowers had to turn to private loans.40 For
years, two education loan markets have coexisted, one federally
backed, the other private.
Critical aspects of the federal student aid scheme, such as loan
forgiveness and variable repayment plans, do not extend to private
student loans, which have become increasingly important to under-
graduate borrowers and their families as the cost of higher education
has increased.41 Private debt is as difficult for students to discharge
through bankruptcy as federal debt,42 and private debt is not eligible
for federal repayment assistance and other programs. The increase in
private debt threatens Congress’s efforts to enable graduates to enter
low-paying careers that serve the public interest.43
B. The Trouble with Debt
Debt is a powerful tool that allows people to consume now what
they could not otherwise afford until later. Student loans permit bor-
loans is tax-deductible, making ownership more beneficial and affordable to consum-
ers. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 936: HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION 2 (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p936.pdf.
39. The College Board found that tuition and fees at private, nonprofit colleges
averaged about $27,293 in the 2010-11 academic year. See COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS
IN COLLEGE PRICING 3 (2010), http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/College_
Pricing_2010.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING]. The average net tuition
and fees, after taking into account financial aid, totaled $11,320 per year (not includ-
ing charges for room and board). Id. at 15, fig. 7. But the total loan amount available
to dependent undergraduates for their education—not annually—is $31,000. For
independent students, the maximum amount available is $57,500. A multi-part test
determines whether a student qualifies as independent or dependent. Direct Stafford
Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/
english/studentloans.jsp (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
40. Between the 1999–2000 and the 2007–2008 academic years, the amount stu-
dents and their families borrowed in the form of private loans nearly quintupled, rising
from $4.5 billion to $21.8 billion. COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 10
(2010), http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/Student_Aid_2010.pdf [hereinafter
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2010]. The amount borrowed in 2008–09 fell, most likely as
a result of the financial crisis that began in the fall of 2008. Id.
41. See supra note 7 and accompanying text and infra note 148 and accompanying R
text.
42. Legislation was proposed in 2010 that would change this, but as of this writing
neither house of Congress has approved it. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. R
43. Programs exist to help repay the debt obligations of graduates who pursue spe-
cific, favored public interest careers. See, e.g., Public Service Loan Forgiveness
(PSLF), U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/
english/PSF.jsp (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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rowers with no collateral, other than the promise the borrowers them-
selves embody, to pay for an education that will contribute to both a
more enlightened society and a more successful graduate.
Because students who complete more schooling generally earn
more,44 the fact that many of them must use loans to pay for college
may not necessarily be troubling. Because the typical borrower re-
ceives a personal financial benefit—higher lifetime income45—as a
result of obtaining more education, the decision to impose a share of
the cost of that education on students is defensible.
But forcing students and their families to borrow has collateral
negative effects, which undermine loan programs’ goal of promoting
access to higher education. First, aversion to debt may cause some
students to forgo higher education when it may be in the community’s
interest that they pursue it.46 Second, debt affects people’s decisions
about career, health, and family47 in ways that may deter graduates
who would otherwise pursue public interest careers. The consequence
may be a reallocation of human capital that does not benefit the
larger community48—that is, students may choose careers that are
44. Orley Ashenfelter & Alan Krueger, Estimates of the Economic Return to
Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1157, 1157 (1994) (find-
ing that “each year of school completed increases a worker’s wage rate by 12–16
percent”).
45. Id.; see also Anna Bernasek, What’s the Return on Education?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2005, at C6 (“[T]he evidence suggests that, up to a point, an additional year
of schooling is likely to raise an individual’s earnings about 10 percent.”).
46. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. R
47. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
60 (2008).
48. This discussion does not focus on regimes to deal with students who do not
complete their education or who fail to obtain employment after graduation. There is a
literature on discharging student loan debts through bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g.,
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405,
411 (2005) (raising concerns that bankruptcy courts’ application of the undue hard-
ship standard has been unequal and at times unfair); Amy E. Sparrow, Unduly Harsh:
The Need to Examine Educational Value in Student Loan Discharge Cases Involving
For-Profit Trade Schools, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 329, 331–32 (2007) (“[S]tudents have
extreme difficulty in persuading a court to discharge their educational loans in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, particularly due to the requirement that a student has suffered an
‘undue hardship’ to qualify for an educational loan discharge.”). There is no perfect
solution to this problem, whether the loans taken out by students are private or federal.
It is not ideal to put the government in the position of screening potential borrowers to
determine their likelihood of completion before extending credit, nor is it desirable to
put taxpayer funds at risk to pay for the education of a student who may take a decade
to complete undergraduate degree requirements. I would err on the side of promoting
access, perhaps with a time limit for school attendance funded with federal loans. See
discussion infra Part III.B.3, regarding types of educational institutions that should be
permitted to participate in an expanded federal loan program.
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more lucrative over careers that lawmakers, at least, view as more
valuable.49
1. No One Has to Borrow
Though it may seem implausible to speak of aversion to debt in
our consumption-driven culture—especially in the wake of disclosure
of just how much consumers borrowed prior to the onset of the 2008
recession—there exist students and parents who are uncomfortable
borrowing to pay for college, graduate, or professional school.50 In
some cases, this may be part of a complete aversion to owing money
to anyone, perhaps for cultural reasons.51 In other cases, it may be that
potential student borrowers and their families fear that possible post-
graduate careers will not yield incomes sufficient to pay off the debt.
Healthy trepidation over student loan borrowing is rational: in
addition to the difficulty of discharging the loans in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings,52 some lenders have engaged in questionable marketing tac-
tics and business practices.53 If aversion to debt were evenly
distributed across the national pool of potential college, graduate, and
professional school students, then perhaps it would raise little concern.
However, recent research suggests that certain populations try to
avoid debt more than others.54 As a result, making student loans a
primary means of paying for higher education may lead to under-rep-
resentation of students from those populations on college and univer-
sity campuses. Debt aversion, then, may undermine one of the explicit
goals of federal student aid programs: to put higher education within
49. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
50. See INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY & EXCELENCIA IN EDUC., STUDENT AVER-
SION TO BORROWING: WHO BORROWS AND WHO DOESN’T 18 (2008), http://www.
edexcelencia.org/system/files/Aversion_to_Borrowing_2008.pdf.
51. For example, one study found that Hispanic and Asian students were less likely
to borrow than were white and black students, and suggested that “[c]ertain character-
istics and cultural contexts may influence their borrowing decisions.” Id.
52. When lawmakers responded to the student loan scandals of 2007 through the
College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRA) and reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act, they did not change the treatment of student loans—even private stu-
dent loans—under the federal Bankruptcy Code. Scholars have addressed the treat-
ment of student loans in bankruptcy proceedings. See infra note 169 and R
accompanying text.
53. See discussion of the loan scandals of 2007 infra Part II.C.
54. See, e.g., INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY & EXCELENCIA IN EDUC., supra note
50, at 18; PAMELA BURDMAN, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS AND SUCCESS, THE STUDENT R
DEBT DILEMMA: DEBT AVERSION AS A BARRIER TO COLLEGE ACCESS 6, 8 (2005),
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/DebtDilemma.pdf; Scott Jaschick, In the
Dark on Aid Changes, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2008/01/31/poll.
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reach of students desiring it.55 For students from populations that are
debt averse, federal programs’ use of loans may also hinder their
achievement of  career aspirations and of the upward social mobility
that education often provides.56
For example, the prospect of student loan debt may undermine
efforts to attract and enroll students who are immigrants or children of
immigrants, or whose families have lower incomes and/or less wealth.
If federal student aid seeks to promote college access and all the good
that flows from widespread higher education, and if loans are the tool
chosen to achieve this, then debt aversion undermines program
efficacy.57
The very process of applying for and taking out a federal student
loan may also deter some potential borrowers.58 The form that stu-
dents must complete in order to obtain a federal loan, the Free Appli-
cation for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), is an exhausting ordeal.59 A
variety of businesses will complete the application process for would-
55. As Senator Prouty put it in 1965, “It is a patent matter of fact that many of our
youth who want and need postsecondary education, and who could derive great bene-
fit therefrom, are denied opportunities to pursue it.” 111 CONG. REC. 22,702 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Prouty).
56. See supra notes 44 and 45 (regarding the financial benefits of investing in R
education).
57. Across the income spectrum, students of Asian and Hispanic backgrounds bor-
row less than members of other groups. See INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY & EX-
CELENCIA IN EDUC., supra note 50. Drawing on Department of Education data from R
2003–04, Excelencia in Education and the Institute for Higher Education Policy report
that thirty-five percent of Asian students with at least $2,000 of financial need after
grants and other aid took out loans, while forty percent of Hispanic students in the
same situation borrowed, forty-three percent of white students and fifty-four percent
of black students. See id. The reasons for the disparities likely reflect influences not
easily subject to quantitative analysis. For example, in some cases students may have
alternative sources of funds. Focus groups conducted with financial aid administra-
tors, students and parents identified cultural biases against borrowing in Asian and
Hispanic communities. See id. at 25. Financial aid officials said that some parents
believed that because they had worked through college, their children should do the
same. See id.
58. See id. at 26.
59. The Obama administration has moved to shorten the form. Tamar Lewin, Eas-
ing a College Financial Aid Headache, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at A12. The De-
partment of Education now pulls directly from the Internal Revenue Service some
information that students had to provide in the past. See Press Release, Department of
Education, Obama Administration Announces Streamlined College Aid Application
(June 24, 2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/06/062420
09.html. The Obama Administration’s education secretary, Arne Duncan, criticized
the old version of the form at his confirmation hearing, telling lawmakers, “You basi-
cally have to have a Ph.D. to figure that thing out.” Tamar Lewin, The Big Test Before
College? The Financial Aid Form, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009 at A1.
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be borrowers for a fee.60 Some students and parents may simply throw
up their hands at the hassle.61
Some evidence exists that debt aversion hurts students in another
way. Some of those who take out loans may be more likely to com-
plete a course: among those students who began college in 2003–04
and needed at least $2,000 beyond other aid but did not borrow, thirty-
six percent had left college without a degree three years later, while
fewer—thirty-one percent of students—who did borrow, had left.62
Among black and Hispanic students, the difference was greater: fifty-
one percent of non-borrowing black students had left without a degree,
compared to thirty-nine percent of black students who did borrow; and
forty-one percent of non-borrowing Hispanic students left, compared
to thirty-two percent who borrowed.63
The notion that fear of debt affects the behavior of some potential
borrowers more than others is entirely plausible, but in-depth research
on the issue is needed. Figuring out the extent to which fear of debt
deters some students from higher education entirely and others from
enrolling in certain types of postsecondary programs would require
interviewing a broad swath of students and families from various ra-
cial and ethnic groups and socioeconomic segments of the popula-
tion.64 Such research is not necessary, though, to conclude that if use
of debt is counterproductive to the effort to promote access to higher
education across the population, other policy tools may be necessary.
2. The Misallocation of Human Capital
Determining how graduates’ debt burdens distort important life
choices, such as decisions about which career to pursue, when to get
married, when to start a family, or when to invest in housing or cars,
presents challenges, too. Even if there were a counterfactual life expe-
rience that a researcher could offer an indebted graduate, what strikes
one observer as a distortion may appear to another to be a rational and
60. Lewin, The Big Test Before College? The Financial Aid Form, supra note 59. R
61. A 2005 study by the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance,
tasked with making recommendations to ease student access to federal aid, warned
that “[m]illions of students and adult learners who aspire to college are overwhelmed
by the complexity of student aid.” ADVISORY COMM. ON STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSIS-
TANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE STUDENT AID GAUNTLET: MAKING ACCESS TO
COLLEGE SIMPLE AND CERTAIN (Jan. 23, 2005), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/
list/acsfa/edlite-gauntlet.html.
62. INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY & EXCELENCIA IN EDUC., supra note 50, at 28. R
63. The pattern does not hold for all students, however. Asian students had similar
persistence rates regardless of borrowing. See id.
64. See id. at 25, 32. Within the broad category of Asian families, students of Chi-
nese and Vietnamese descent appear to be particularly resistant to borrowing.
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therefore desirable response to a combination of personal financial cir-
cumstances and market incentives.
At least one survey of college graduates coping with student
loans shows that borrowers believe that their debts affected decisions
they made about both their personal lives and their careers. A 1993
study that compared data on borrowers between 1985 and 1991 found
that for one-quarter of 1991 graduates, debt affected decisions about
when to marry and for thirty-five percent, decisions about when to
have children.65 Nearly half said they rented housing rather than buy-
ing because of their loan obligations, and forty percent also reported
working at least two jobs in order to keep up with payments.66 More
than forty percent said they were working either in a less desirable
and/or higher-paying job as a result of loans.67 Perhaps most dis-
turbing, more than one-third said they put off needed health care as a
result of debt.68 In every case, the percentage of study respondents
reporting these effects was larger in 1991 than in 1985, sometimes
significantly.69 The effects of debt likely grow stronger as debt bur-
dens increase.
If debt deters borrowers from public service careers, then bor-
rowers’ responses to debt are undermining a critical goal of federal
programs. If students resist borrowing in the first place and are not
actually swayed by the availability of repayment assistance, then al-
though lawmakers have established various programs to help gradu-
ates repay their loans to encourage them to become teachers,
firefighters, and members of other important but less well compen-
sated professions,70 forgiveness may come too late.
65. JOSEPH D. BOYD & CAROL WENNERDAHL, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENT
BORROWERS IN REPAYMENT AND THE IMPACT OF EDUCATIONAL DEBT 26, tbl.10
(1993), http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED367284.pdf.
66. Id.; see also Jonathan D. Glater, High Tuition Debts and Low Pay Drain Public
Interest Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A1 (describing indebted law school grad-
uates taking second jobs to try to afford loan payments while pursuing public interest
law careers).
67. BOYD & WENNERDAHL, supra note 65. R
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Public Service Loan For-
giveness Program Questions and Answers (Feb. 3, 2010) http://studentaid.ed.gov/stu-
dents/attachments/siteresources/PSLF_QAs_final_02%2012%2010.pdf; Public
Service Loan Forgiveness, supra note 18 (describing federal loan forgiveness pro- R
grams for graduates working for public service organizations, including “any federal,
state, or local government organization or agency and most charitable non-profit orga-
nizations”); Student Loan Forgiveness for Teachers, supra note 20 (describing for- R
giveness assistance for graduates going into certain teaching fields). Other states have
similar programs for teachers, nurses and other careers.
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Recent studies offer more information about the different choices
indebted students make about what to do after graduation relative to
decisions by their debt-free classmates. Two studies, which include
analysis of repayment assistance programs, are discussed below.
a. “Anon U”
In the early 2000s, one wealthy, elite university71—“Anon U”—
eliminated loans from its financial aid packages and replaced them
with grants, freeing students who would otherwise have to borrow
from repayment obligations. Jesse Rothstein and Cecilia Elena Rouse,
two Princeton University graduate students at the time, studied the
results of the shift by comparing career choices made by graduates
who differed only in their debt burdens.72 They found that the students
benefitting from the no-loans policy made different choices:
[D]ebt leads graduates to choose higher-salary jobs. Much or all of
this effect is across occupations, as debt appears to reduce the
probability that students choose low-paid “public interest” jobs.
Debt effects are most notable on the propensity to take a job in the
education industry. We also find suggestive (though imprecise) evi-
dence that financial constraints affect students’ academic perform-
ance during college.73
The study found that when the university freed students from the
burden of debt, the students opted to pursue less financially lucrative
careers. Among financial aid recipients there was “a notable increase
71. The university shared data on its financial aid policies on the condition that it
not be identified. However, newspaper articles appearing at approximately the time
described by the research here suggest that the institution was Princeton University;
the newspaper articles described changes in aid policy that were very similar to
changes described in the research article. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Princeton Will
Liberalize Its Financial Aid Formulas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1998, at B12 (“The plan
. . . eliminates loans for students whose families earn less than $40,000 a year, turning
them into grants.”); Mary Beth Markelin, Princeton Overhauls Aid to Ease Students’
Burden, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 1998, at D9 (“Princeton would no longer automatically
include $4,000 in federal loans as part of its aid. Instead, for students whose family
income falls below $40,000, the aid package would substitute scholarships or
grants.”).
72. Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia E. Rouse, Constrained after College: Student Loans
and Early Career Occupational Choices 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13117, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13117.
73. Id. Rothstein and Rouse set out expecting to find effects of debt to be “ex-
tremely small,” because debt for the typical college graduate is slightly more than one
percent of lifetime earnings. Id. at 2. They offer two possible explanations for the
outcome of their study: debt aversion or credit constraints—meaning that graduates
find it harder to borrow after college, the more they already borrowed to pay for
college.
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in the share taking jobs in the nonprofit, government and education
sectors.”74
b. New York University School of Law
At approximately the same time that the unnamed undergraduate
institution studied by Rothstein and Rouse instituted its new education
funding program, New York University School of Law conducted a
similar experiment through its financial aid policies. NYU created a
lottery for law students interested in traditionally low-paying, public
interest careers.75 Lottery winners received partial tuition subsidies in
place of loans. Both the lottery winners and losers could participate in
the law school’s loan forgiveness program, which repaid students’
debts76 in full over a ten-year term.77
Economist Erica Field studied the results of the school’s policy
changes and found that students who won the lottery were signifi-
cantly more likely to accept admission to NYU instead of enrolling at
another law school.78 In addition, according to an entry survey of stu-
dents, lottery losers reported “planning to spend nearly twice the
amount of career time in a private law firm relative to lottery win-
ners.”79 Students who won the lottery were more likely to work in
public interest law.80
74. Id. at 23.
75. Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a
Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Jan.
2009, at 1, 3–4.
76. It is not clear from Field’s discussion whether only federal loans qualified for
replacement or whether both federal and private loans were eligible.
77. Students who received subsidies toward tuition up-front would have to repay
the amounts received if they did not keep their public interest jobs for a certain period
of time after graduation.
78. Field, supra note 75, at 13. Separately, Field’s research suggests that debt aver- R
sion is a real phenomenon: the law school’s parallel assistance programs were de-
signed so that their economic value was identical, but her results show that borrowers
and potential borrowers cared whether their financial aid came in the form of grants or
loans. Her research does not break down the reaction of would-be public interest law-
yers by race or other demographic characteristics, which might capture differing de-
grees of aversion.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id. at 17–18. Field finds that $10,000 in student loan debt “reduces the likeli-
hood of taking a public interest job two years out of law school by approximately
6%.” Id. at 18. Field is unequivocal in concluding that the tuition subsidy program at
NYU was a powerful recruitment tool: “[T]he numbers suggest that 18.5% of lottery
winners in the classes of 1999 and 2000 would not have attended NYU had they lost
the lottery . . . . [I]t is unambiguous that tuition subsidies increased the supply of NYU
graduates.” Id. at 14.
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3. The Rewards of Reducing Debt
For both law students and undergraduates, less debt led to greater
participation in public interest employment.81 But a lighter loan bur-
den also confers benefits far beyond the individual borrower. Repay-
ment obligations have collateral effects on borrowers’ children,
parents, and others close to them.82 This issue almost certainly be-
comes more significant as loan balances balloon and repayment obli-
gations stretch on for ten, fifteen, or even twenty-five years after
graduation. Divorced spouses can count on less alimony,83 and em-
ployers may find employees who are burdened by loans to be more
distracted and less productive.84 Aging relatives can expect less finan-
cial support from indebted children.85 In fact, parents may find them-
selves supporting their children, in turn, affecting the older
generation’s saving capacity and retirement decisions.86 Indebted
graduates and their spouses may also be forced to put off retirement.
C. The Promise and Challenges of Loan Repayment
Assistance Programs
Society suffers when debt leads graduates to forgo careers that
would have benefitted the larger community.87 Thus, debt can under-
mine the public good. Private student debt poses a particular problem
because it is not eligible for repayment assistance programs available
to federal loan borrowers. If more students take out private loans to
pay for college, their debt may steer them away from careers in the
public interest that are eligible for federal loan repayment assistance.
81. Harvard Law School conducted a similar experiment a few years later, when it
announced that it would waive tuition for third-year students if they promised to work
for five years for either a nonprofit organization or the government. Almost twice as
many students as expected signed up. This response was so overwhelming that the
institution suspended the program. Tamar Lewin, Harvard Law School Suspends Pro-
gram Giving Students Free Tuition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A25.
82. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 47, at 59 (describing, in particular, the impact of R
family financial distress on children).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 62 (citing case studies listed in U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDA-
TORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR
DEPENDENTS 39–43 (2006)).
85. Id. at 60.
86. Id. at 61 (“An individual in financial distress will often require support from
more distant family, friends, or the state.”).
87. This discussion does not cover all the ways that indebted graduates’ life deci-
sions may be affected by debt. For example, graduates might put off having children
or buying a house. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. It is not clear what the R
societal benefits or costs to shifting the timing of such decisions may be.
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Private borrowing thus undermines achievement of some of the socie-
tal benefits of higher education.
Nevertheless, if we weigh costs and benefits, we should address
the role that debt plays in graduates’ life choices only if the benefit to
society from a choice unconstrained by debt exceeds the cost of reduc-
ing or eliminating that debt. While we may lament that the best and
brightest graduates of colleges and universities pursue investment
banking jobs instead of careers in the public interest, for example, the
income taxes these graduates pay may outweigh the benefit of addi-
tional public service. However, that comparison excludes much that is
both subjective and intangible. A cost-benefit analysis is frustrated by
the fact that wages in public interest jobs may not accurately reflect
the worth of those forms of employment to society. Without engaging
in a debate over the efficiency of labor markets and the appropriate
weight to be given to wages those markets set for certain jobs, it
seems safe to conclude that there are careers that (1) are of positive
value to society, (2) pay wages that do not reflect the societal value of
the jobs, (3) students wish to pursue, and (4) nevertheless, students are
deterred from pursuing as a result of debt.
Members of Congress and state legislatures88 have reached this
conclusion. Using federal aid programs, lawmakers have tried to pro-
mote not only access to higher education but also public service. They
have enacted statutory provisions addressing student loans, requiring
the state to reduce the debt burdens borne by graduates who allocate
their human capital in ways lawmakers deem desirable. In the College
Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRA),89 passed by Congress in
2007, lawmakers included provisions intended to promote public ser-
vice through an expanded federal loan repayment assistance program.
The program benefits graduates working in a broad range of areas,
including:
emergency management, government, military service, public
safety, law enforcement, public health, public education (including
early childhood education), social work in a public child or family
88. States such as Iowa, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Kentucky have created
programs that help indebted graduates pay off their loans if they enter fields such as
nursing, primary and secondary education, firefighting, and public interest law. In at
least one state, repayment assistance has taken the form of reduced interest rates
charged to borrowers. Unfortunately, deteriorating economic conditions forced some
lenders and state agencies to cut back on their repayment assistance. See Jonathan D.
Glater, Recession Imperils Loan Forgiveness Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009 at
B1.
89. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401,
121 Stat. 784, 800 (2007).
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service agency, public interest law services (including prosecution
or public defense or legal advocacy in low-income communities at
a nonprofit organization), public child care, public service for indi-
viduals with disabilities, public service for the elderly, public li-
brary sciences, school-based library sciences and other school-
based services.90
The federal initiative combines loan forgiveness, contingent upon
public service, with a more generous repayment option that takes into
account an indebted graduate’s income.91 In the income-based repay-
ment program, borrowers pay a fraction of their income for twenty-
five years and then the government forgives any remaining balance.92
However, if the borrower takes a job in the public interest, loan for-
giveness is accelerated, so that a graduate is debt-free after ten years
of work in an eligible job.93
The income-based repayment plan and repayment assistance pro-
gram are major improvements over the preexisting payment options
offered with regard to federal loans.94 However, the new programs do
not encompass private loans or federal PLUS loans taken out by de-
90. Id. § 401. CCRA also lowered interest rates on federal loans. Id. § 201(a). It
also raised the maximum amounts available through the federal Pell Grant scholarship
program for the neediest students. Id. § 102(b)(9)(B). Finally, it reduced the subsidy
payment that the federal government paid to loan companies to encourage them to
make federally guaranteed student loans. Id. § 305(a).
91. Jonathan D. Glater, College Loan Payments Will Be Linked to Income, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A14.
92. The program also requires that borrowers’ loans be held by the federal govern-
ment. Students who took out federal loans from a bank or other private lender must
shift them into the government’s direct loan program, a process typically referred to as
“loan consolidation.” See Income-Based Repayment Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http:/
/studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/IBRPlan.jsp (last visited Oct.
6, 2010).
93. The federal Department of Education separately offers loan repayment assis-
tance to teachers of mathematics and the sciences in particular. Id.; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., STAFFORD LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM FOR TEACHERS, available
at http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/15936_GPO_Stafford_
SCREEN.pdf (describing loan forgiveness available from the federal government for
secondary school teachers in specific fields). Congress has also excluded from income
tax the value of debt forgiveness provided through one of the repayment assistance
programs. 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (2006).
94. Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Inter-
est Lawyers and Other Employees of Government and Nonprofit Organizations, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 35 (2007). Professor Schrag outlines the program in detail in
this very helpful article, noting that “the income-based formula for computing the
amount due each month results in payments that are lower” than under its predecessor
payment plan, known as “income-contingent repayment.” Under the income-based
plan, the government pays the interest on certain types of federal loans for borrowers
for up to three years.
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pendent students’ parents.95 Nor do they guarantee that students who
would like to work in the public sector will obtain qualifying jobs. The
prospect of making payments for twenty-five years, even relatively
modest payments, might not reassure students already worried about
debt. As the experience at NYU School of Law shows, repayment
assistance alone may not be enough to overcome an aversion to
borrowing.96
Elizabeth Warren, Sandy Baum, and Ganesh Sitaraman have pro-
posed a much broader loan repayment assistance initiative that would
pay off graduates’ federal loan obligations in exchange for four years
of public interest service97 instead of ten. Their program would also
guarantee public interest jobs to graduates who want them.98 It would
be a tremendously valuable benefit for students interested in such jobs.
A government pledge to provide public interest jobs seems un-
likely, in light of fiscal limits and taxpayer resistance to government
spending,99 no matter the strength and appeal of the argument that
greater access to higher education and broader participation in public
service will produce a more engaged and informed democratic polity.
95. Given the limits on how much students can borrow themselves, they and their
families often turn to PLUS loans to cover additional costs. See supra note 15. There- R
fore, parental indebtedness—for which parents may ask or require assistance from
graduates—persists, regardless of postgraduate income and career choice. Graduate
PLUS loans, on the other hand, would be eligible for the program, which is good news
for law and other graduate students interested in public interest careers.
96. See Field, supra note 75, at 22. Field’s study compared the impact on students’ R
career choices of loan repayment assistance after graduation with the provision of
tuition subsidies while in law school; the economic value of the two programs was
identical to borrowers. Nevertheless, the subsidies were “associated with higher rates
of public interest law than are financially equivalent backward-looking loan repay-
ment schemes[,] provid[ing] strong evidence of the influence of debt aversion on job
choice.” Id.
97. Warren et al., supra note 19, at 131. R
98. See id. at 135. Further, the program outlined by Warren, Baum, and Sitaraman
would provide that “[i]f student demand exceeded the supply of opportunities, then
the federal government would commit to expanding its service opportunities so that
those who want to serve would have that chance.” Id.
99. State and local governments put employees on furloughs and laid them off as
the recession that began with a credit crunch in 2008 reduced tax revenues and, conse-
quently, government budgets. In California, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger in January
2009 ordered state employees to take two days off each month, leading to closure of
some state offices. The move was contested by employee unions. See Patrick
McGreevy, Judge Orders Schwarzenegger to Halt State Worker Furloughs, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A4. In Jefferson County, Alabama, as many as 1,400 county
employees, or two-thirds of county employees subject to layoffs, expected to lose
their jobs last summer. Shaila Dewan, Alabama Area Reeling in Face of Fiscal Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at A1.
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At the same time, many students want to find employment in the
public interest and are unable to do so, even when the economy is
growing. There is no way to know whether there are enough public
interest jobs to absorb all of the indebted students who might hope to
benefit from a loan repayment program. The impact of the economic
downturn that began in 2008 likely worsened the problem because
more students turned to public service as the private sector
contracted.100
These repayment assistance programs, even the expansive ver-
sion put forth by Warren, Baum, and Sitaraman, do not cover private
loans. Reliance on private loans undermines policies seeking to realize
benefits characteristic of higher education as a public good. Private
loans therefore interfere with achieving a critical goal of federal stu-
dent aid. Forgiveness programs would be more effective if students
did not need to use private loans—that is, if federal loan ceilings were
lifted.101 If graduates’ loans came through federal loan programs, then
all debts would be eligible for repayment assistance programs support-
ing careers in the public interest.102
II.
WARRING WORLDS: FEDERAL AND PRIVATE LOANS
In light of the downsides of student loan debt, why is borrowing
at the center of higher education finance? This part of the article first
100. Consider the case of Teach For America, which received 35,000 applicants for
its 2009 class, more than in any single year in its past and a forty-two percent increase
from the prior year. Just fifteen percent of applicants were accepted. Press Release,
Teach For America, Teach For America Adds Largest Number of New Teachers and
Regions in 20-Year History (May 28, 2009), available at http://www.teachforamerica.
org/newsroom/documents/20090528_Teach_For_America_Adds_Largest_Number_of
_Teachers_in_History.htm; see also About Teach For America (on file with author)
(reporting that “[a]t more than 130 colleges and universities, over 5 percent of the
senior class applied” to participate in the program).
101. Warren, Baum, and Sitaraman call for raising the maximum amounts students
may borrow through federal loan programs. Warren et al., supra note 19, at 132 n.29 R
(“Under existing loan limits, students are increasingly turning to banks and other pri-
vate lenders for supplementary funds . . . . The difficulty of including [private loans]
in a publicly funded loan forgiveness program makes it imperative that their growth
be stemmed . . . .”).
102. In July 2009, Senator Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, proposed legislation
that would permit students who had taken out private education loans to refinance
through federal loan programs. This “debt swap” proposal would permit students who
were eligible for federal Stafford loans, but did not borrow all they could have, to
refinance into Stafford loans bearing a fixed interest rate (6.8%). Brown Announces
Bill to Help Americans with Costly Private Student Loan Debt, supra note 21. As of R
November 2010, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
had yet to vote on the bill.
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addresses that question by providing a brief history of federal college
aid programs, beginning with HEA.103 The second section explains
the more recent, parallel growth in the use of private student loans to
pay for college and explores risks to borrowers of taking on private
debt. The third section summarizes the student loan scandals of 2007.
The fourth section analyzes the legislative responses to those scandals
and argues that the steps taken by lawmakers failed to advance or
protect two of the federal aid programs’ primary goals: bolstering de-
mocracy by enabling more students to choose public interest careers
and aiding student borrowers to pursue their own ambitions.
A. Federal Student Aid
At the time of HEA’s passage, the nation was recovering from
the loss of a president who had come to represent youth and hope for a
better future. John F. Kennedy spoke of the “new frontier of educa-
tion” in a speech in 1960, warning that “already our colleges are being
overcrowded, their costs are rising, and some fifty percent of our top
students do not receive a higher education.”104
Lyndon Johnson sought to build on the sense of national purpose
that his predecessor had so lyrically evoked105 to establish a “Great
Society” in the United States. The sweeping Civil Rights Act, barring
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex, had become law
in 1964, just a year earlier. It had followed a famous speech in Wash-
ington, D.C. by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., a civil rights leader
at the apex of his power and influence.
The federal student aid system grew out of concerns about both
the nation’s future106 and the reliability of the private sector as a
103. This history could also start a few decades earlier, with the Servicemen’s Read-
justment Act of 1944. This legislation, popularly known as the “G.I. Bill,” provided
tuition, books, supplies, equipment, and other assistance to veterans who continued
their education. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-345,
§ 400(b)(5), 58 Stat. 284, 289 (1944). The National Defense Education Act, passed in
1958, included support for loans to college students. See The Federal Role in Educa-
tion, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last
visited Sept. 7, 2010).
104. Senator John F. Kennedy, Remarks at the Valley Forge Country Club (Oct. 29,
1960), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=74292.
105. Consider also the soaring rhetoric at the inauguration of President Kennedy:
“[M]y fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you
can do for your country. My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will
do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.” President John F.
Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. R
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source of credit107 for students and families trying to keep up with the
rising cost of higher education. In the 1960s, lawmakers sought to
promote access to higher education for an unprecedented number of
young Americans.108 Lawmakers wanted loan programs to make indi-
vidual students’ aspirations possible.109
HEA was an ambitious piece of legislation. In the words of Presi-
dent Johnson, the overarching goal was no less than to give “[e]very
child . . . the best education that this Nation can provide,”110 because
“no nation can be both ignorant and free.”111
Lawmakers were concerned about the difficulty facing students
and their families coping with the practical challenge of finding
money to pay for college—the same challenge that exists today for
would-be college students. The dollar amounts were far lower, but the
pace of tuition increases was comparable to the rate today: between
1955 and 1965, costs at private colleges increased forty percent,112 to
an average price of $2,370; at public institutions costs had risen by
thirty percent, to an average of $1,560.113
Lawmakers worried that rising tuition compelled more middle-
class families to turn to commercial loans to help pay for their chil-
dren’s higher education.114 However, commercial and consumer loan
terms did not favor borrowers. “[C]ommercial credit is frequently
available only at high interest rates and must be repaid in the same
year115 in which it is borrowed,”116 Senator Ralph W. Yarborough, a
Texas Democrat, stated during discussion of the legislation.
107. See infra note 116 and accompanying text (describing risks of commercial R
credit for education loans).
108. Debating HEA , Senator Edward Bartlett lamented “serious lacks” in higher
education policy, “which can only be corrected, it appears, by the helping hand of the
Federal Government.” 111 CONG. REC. 22,643 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bartlett).
109. Discussing the legislation in 1965, Senator Jennings Randolph cited the goal of
“extend[ing] the benefits of college education to more students by . . . establishing,
assisting, and stimulating programs of insured reduced-interest loans for college stu-
dents.” Id. at 22,662 (statement of Sen. Randolph).
110. President Lyndon Baines Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 4, 1965).
111. Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson). Appealing to the nation’s can-do spirit, Johnson
added, “Today no nation can be both ignorant and great.”
112. 111 CONG. REC. 22,702 (1965) (statement of Sen. Prouty).
113. Id. at 22,700.
114. Id. at 22,692 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (“With the ever-increasing cost of
education, the financial burden of educating children has come to bear increasingly
heavily upon middle income families . . . . [I]t is frequently very difficult for them to
finance college study out of annual income,” forcing them to turn to commercial
loans).
115. For example, a student could not defer interest payments until after graduation,
at which point a borrower would presumably earn wages from employment.
116. 111 CONG. REC. 22,692 (1965) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
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Federally guaranteed student loans were not a forgone conclusion
in 1965, in part because many states already operated their own educa-
tion loan programs.117 Other ideas were also under consideration. For
example, some politicians championed the use of tax credits for the
cost of education.118 Another proposal would have provided loans but,
recognizing that graduates enjoyed a boost in earnings from obtaining
a degree, would have required borrowers to pay twenty-five percent of
that “profit,” a figure which would be calculated by comparing a bor-
rower’s wages to the average earnings of someone with only a high
school degree.119
The guaranteed student loan program took as its model preexist-
ing state programs and loans offered under the National Defense Edu-
cation Act (NDEA), a law passed in 1958 in reaction to the launch of
the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union.120 At that time, lawmakers
encouraged Americans to educate themselves in scientific and techni-
cal fields. NDEA provided for improved elementary and secondary
school teaching in science, mathematics, and foreign languages, as
well as for funding of student loans for higher education.121
During the HEA debate, lawmakers supported a federal guarantee
of student loans because they saw it as a way of leveraging federal
money to harness private sector capital. Without a government guar-
antee of repayment, lenders might not extend credit to students and
families, because such loans carried an unacceptable level of risk.122
After all, students had no collateral, little or no income at the time of
borrowing and only hope of earning an income in the future. In de-
signing HEA’s guaranteed loan program, lawmakers hammered out an
agreement involving banks, state lending agencies, the Treasury De-
117. See id. at 22,665 (statement of Sen. Javits) (“Ninteen [sic] States already have
active student loan insurance programs and three more have plans which will be oper-
ative shortly.”).
118. The Treasury Department criticized this approach, because it would largely
benefit better-off students with less financial need.
119. See 111 CONG. REC. 22,690 (1965) (statement of Sen. Miller). The proposal
went nowhere. Id. at 22,691.
120. See The Federal Role in Education, supra note 103 (“The Cold War stimulated R
the first example of comprehensive Federal education legislation, when in 1958 Con-
gress passed the National Defense Education Act . . . in response to the Soviet launch
of Sputnik.”).
121. Id.
122. In the years since the passage of HEA, lenders appear to have grown much
more cavalier about extending credit. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Tight Mortgage
Rules Exclude Even Good Risks, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at A1 (describing “the
lax lending standards of 2006, when buyers with no income or documentation could
get loans”).
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partment, Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare.123
In the guaranteed loan system, which lawmakers voted to shut
down in 2010, lenders received a fixed rate of return, set by Congress,
on federal student loans they made. Congress separately capped the
interest rate borrowers paid on federal loans. If a borrower defaulted,
lenders were reimbursed for nearly 100% of the outstanding loan bal-
ance by state or regional guarantee agencies—holdovers from the pre-
HEA system. Those agencies were in turn reimbursed by the federal
government.124
At the time of passage, lawmakers viewed this system of loan
insurance as a win for everyone. According to Senator Winston
Prouty, “[T]he loan insurance program bears the hallmark of the best
type of Federal aid to education: it supplements, rather than supplants,
efforts initiated by the States [sic] and private organizations.”125 Put
another way, the program advanced both the goal of promoting access
to higher education, with all the benefits for a growing democracy
discussed in Part I, and the goal of advancing private enterprise, pre-
sumably with the benefits of creating jobs and wealth. Lawmakers
perhaps did not foresee the potential conflict between the interest of
both society and students in accessing education and the interest of
private industry in profits.
In the years since HEA was passed, a few politicians questioned
the need to provide an incentive for lenders to make student loans.
Although guaranteeing federal loans might encourage lenders to de-
ploy private capital for the public good of promoting higher education,
the loans could also be made directly by the federal government.126
123. 111 CONG. REC. 22,704 (1965) (statement of Sen. Morse).
124. Whose interests were best served by this structure, in which the federal govern-
ment paid a private intermediary to make a loan that the government guaranteed, was
fiercely debated for twenty years, with banks and other lenders contending they saved
taxpayer funds and advocates of direct lending by the government dismissing that
claim as impossible. For example, the budget presented by President George W. Bush
in 2006 claimed that $100 in federal loans by a lender cost the government $13.81,
while making the same loan through the direct loan program cost just $3.85. See
Jonathan D. Glater & Karen W. Arenson, Lenders Sought Edge Against U.S. in Stu-
dent Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, at A1. Student loan companies argued that the
direct loan program was actually more expensive. Id.
125. 111 CONG. REC. 22,702 (1965) (statement of Sen. Prouty).
126. An early champion of this view was Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who helped
design the direct loan program. Kelly Field, Sen. Edward Kennedy, Longtime Cham-
pion of Higher Education, Dies at 77, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 26, 2009),
http://chronicle.com/article/Sen-Edward-Kennedy-Longti/48175/.
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One of the politicians who held this view was President Bill Clin-
ton. Clinton supported direct lending, but not as an end in itself—that
is, not simply out of concern that lenders might exploit students’ need-
iness, rather than or in addition to helping more of them enroll and
become productive citizens. Clinton wanted to make public service
more affordable for a greater number of college graduates. The na-
tional service program he described on the campaign trail in 1992 in-
cluded loan repayment assistance for college graduates who
participated in public service. Under this program, low-income gradu-
ates would have an extended period over which to repay their student
debts. They would also pay a fraction of their actual incomes, rather
than a fixed amount based on their loan balance. This repayment
scheme foreshadowed the income-based system discussed above.127
This “pay-as-you-go”128 scheme relied on the involvement of the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS), the only entity that would know gradu-
ates’ earnings and therefore be able to calculate how much, based on
income, they should repay.129 If the IRS were not to handle the pro-
cess, private lenders would have to give students’ financial and bor-
rowing information to a third party. And “[i]f the government was
going to switch to pay-as-you-can loans, then, it ma[de] sense to adopt
simultaneously another radical reform: eliminating the entire student-
aid industry and adopting ‘direct lending,’” such that the government
would itself extend loans to students.130 Accordingly, in 1993, the
Clinton administration pushed for legislation that would enable direct
lending.131
All colleges and universities would be moved into a direct lend-
ing system, thereby eliminating a role for banks and other private
lenders in federal student lending. These financial institutions have
consistently opposed such a move,132 arguing that service to students
127. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
128. STEVEN WALDMAN, THE BILL: HOW LEGISLATION REALLY BECOMES LAW: A
CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE BILL 31 (1996).
129. Id. at 53–55.
130. Id.
131. From a borrower’s perspective, moving to direct lending would simply change
the delivery channel for loan funds. For banks and other lenders, though, the move
would be costly; for this reason, financial institutions fought the plan. Adam Clymer,
New U.S. Program of Student Loans Clears Key Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1993, at
A1 (“[L]oan guarantee companies and secondary lenders like the Student Loan Mar-
keting Association, or Sallie Mae, had mounted a stiff lobbying effort against the
plan.”).
132. Clifford Krauss, Skeptics and Lobbyists Besiege Student Loan Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1993, at A14.
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would suffer.133 The administration lost the argument in Congress be-
cause lawmakers did not shut down the guaranteed program, although
they did approve creation of the direct loan program and an income-
contingent repayment option for borrowers.134 Consequently, colleges
and universities could choose whether to participate in the direct loan
program or the guaranteed loan program.135
The parallel, competing lending programs were subjects of in-
tense debate and fierce lobbying for years.136 The battle over the chan-
nel through which federal loan money reached students foreclosed
discussion of the larger question of how the federal aid system could
best help students gain access to college. The lending industry did all
it could to hobble the direct loan program, for example, by offering
universities money to use the guaranteed loan program.137 These and
other lender tactics were possible because federal “oversight [was] so
lax that the Education Department’s assistant inspector general in
2003 called for tightened regulation of lender dealings with universi-
ties.”138 To compete with the federal direct loan program, lenders cut
fees and offered interest rate rebates.139
When the Department of Education responded to private lenders’
moves to undercut the direct loan program by lowering the program’s
interest rates and certain loan fees, the private lenders sued, using the
law that had created federal aid programs as a weapon in a market-
place battle against the government. Lenders argued that the adminis-
133. For example, a Sallie Mae spokesman, Tom Joyce, more recently argued that
“the private sector program has better prices, better product selection, better service
and better technology.” Glater & Arenson, supra note 124. R
134. Instead, the legislation included a limit on how much of the student loan market
the government could capture. Clymer, supra note 131 see also A History of Direct R
Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dlfsheets/doc0006_bodyoftext.
htm (“The Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, a part of the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1993, authorized that the program be implemented on a phased-in basis.
Such a phase-in would be based on total guaranteed student loan volume: 5 percent in
the first year, 1994–95; 40 percent in the second year, 1995–96; 50 percent in the
third and fourth years, 1996–97 and 1997–98; and 60 percent in the fifth year,
1998–99.”).
135. Students generally could not choose between the federal direct loan and guaran-
teed loan programs. Colleges and universities chose which program to use.
136. See Glater & Arenson, supra note 124, at A25. R
137. Id. The article goes on to list cases in which lenders offered incentives to col-
leges and universities to leave the federal direct loan program.
138. Id.
139. The rates set by Congress were maximum rates. Lenders had the discretion to
reduce them as a reward for on-time payments, for example.
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tration lacked the authority to make such changes to loan terms
without Congressional approval.140
Lenders’ motives were clear. The companies that made student
loans had grown powerful and hugely profitable. Their student loan
operations generated safe, secure profits. The government entity cre-
ated to lend to students, the Student Loan Marketing Corporation,
became Sallie Mae, a for-profit, publicly traded corporation and the
largest maker of student loans in the country. In 2007, the company
reported a federal loan portfolio of more than $109 billion at year’s
end141 and reported interest income of more than $6.3 billion.142
Nelnet, another large loan company, reported holding $26 billion in
loans in the same year, generating interest income of $1.6 billion.143
Citigroup and other large financial institutions also have significant
student loan operations.
Despite the dramatically increased generosity of financial aid
programs at institutions of higher education, student indebtedness has
continued to climb. Colleges with the means to do so have pursued a
high-price, high-aid strategy, which allows them to offer more finan-
cial assistance to the poorest students while charging the wealthiest
students the publicly stated tuition or “sticker price.”
Critics have raised concerns about the implications of this pricing
scheme.144 Some argue that the system disfavors middle class fami-
140. See Glater & Arenson, supra note 124, at A25; see also Government-Guaran- R
teed Student Loan Lenders [sic] Lawsuit Threatens Millions in Savings for Direct
Loan Borrowers, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/News/001215.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2010) (warning that the lawsuit threatened to undo “fee reduction and
repayment incentives . . . [that] save students and parents money, are in the best
interests of the taxpayer, and help prevent defaults”).
141. SLM Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-67 (Dec. 31, 2007), http://www.
salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/98EB09F8-712E-41E5-B14B-B694791574F9/8874/200
710KBOW49222BOW014_BITS_NFeb292009.pdf [hereinafter SLM Corp. 2007 An-
nual Report]. Circumstances have changed as the economy has deteriorated, but Sallie
Mae remains a large and powerful company. As of Dec. 31, 2009, Sallie Mae held
nearly $43 billion in federal loans. SLM Corp. 2009 Annual Report, supra note 10, at R
37.
142. SLM Corp. 2007 Annual Report, supra note 141, at F-4, F-5. R
143. Nelnet Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6, F-3 (Dec. 31, 2008), http://
www.nelnetinvestors.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1362310-08-1178.
144. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard’s Aid to Middle Class Pressures Rivals,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at A1. Researchers of financial aid worried that “if
Harvard’s new aid program encouraged more middle- and upper-middle-income stu-
dents to apply, then the number of slots for low-income applicants in an entering class
would probably decline.” One college president also worried that such a decline could
result if colleges gave more aid to high-achieving but well-off applicants instead of
poorer students. Id.
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lies.145 Others complain that it puts public colleges and universities,
many of which face the same cost pressures associated with faculty
recruitment, administration, and research funding as their private com-
petitors, at a competitive disadvantage because they lack the resources
to offer generous aid packages. So far, a politically feasible, new
model for allocating the cost of college among students, educational
institutions, and the government has not appeared.146
B. The Private Loan Alternative
Rising demand for higher education has coincided with decreas-
ing public support for institutions of higher learning. While in absolute
terms state support of public colleges and universities has not fallen
steadily, financial support per student has declined.147 As a result,
more of the cost of higher education has landed on the shoulders of
students and their parents, even as the price of higher education has
risen. For decades, tuition has increased more quickly than the prices
of other goods and services. At some private colleges and universities,
the sum of tuition, fees, room, and board exceeds $50,000 per year.148
For families of average means whose incomes have gone up less
quickly,149 the price of college is an ever-growing obstacle.150
145. For example, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, director of the Cornell Higher Education
Research Institute, warned that “[e]ventually, if we’re going to keep raising tuition at
rates much more than the increase in family incomes, then something has to be done
to make the places more accessible to the middle class,” because more aid will go to
students on the basis of academic merit and to the poorest students. Jonathan D. Glater
& Alan Finder, In Tuition Game, Popularity Rises With Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2006, at A1.
146. Although in 2010 Congress approved the most dramatic overhaul of federal
student aid programs in decades—eliminating the guaranteed loan program—that
move neither compels colleges to change how they set tuition and allocate aid money,
nor frees students from an ever-growing debt burden. See Herszenhorn & Lewin,
supra note 15. R
147. See TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 39, at 18 figs.10a & b. R
148. For example, annual tuition, fees, and room and board at Georgetown Univer-
sity cost up to $52,443 for a first-year undergraduate student in the 2010–11 academic
year. That figure does not include travel costs, books, or other incidentals. Board
Approves Tuition Increases for 2010-2011: Funds for Undergraduate Financial Aid
to Increase, GEORGETOWN UNIV., http://explore.georgetown.edu/news/?ID=49130
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
149. Household income has increased steadily but more slowly, around one to two
percent, adjusted for inflation; in 2007 and 2008, household income actually fell. See
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 29, http://www.census.
gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf; see also David Leonhardt, A Decade with No In-
come Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2009, 11:52 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/09/10/a-decade-with-no-income-gain/ (reporting that in 2008, “The typical
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The government limits how much students can borrow through
federal loan programs. Currently, a first-year undergraduate student
can borrow up to $5,500 per year. A second-year student is limited to
$6,500, and students who have completed at least two years of study
can borrow up to $7,500 per year.151 The aggregate total amount of
borrowing possible for undergraduate students is $31,000.152 These
amounts do not cover the cost of attending many private institutions153
or flagship public colleges and universities.154 The need to fill the gap
between federal loan amounts and the total cost of higher education
has led to the meteoric growth of private lending.155
American household made less money last year than the typical household made a full
decade ago.”).
150. Median household income in 1980 was $42,429; in 2007, it had risen to
$50,233, after taking inflation into account. Table 674: Money Income of House-
holds—Percent Distribution by Income Level, Race, and Hispanic Origin in Constant
(2007) Dollars: 1980 to 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compen-
dia/statab/2010/tables/10s0674.pdf. That difference represents growth in income of
18.4%. In the same time period, average annual tuition and fees rose from $9,535 to
$24,852 at nonprofit, private colleges and from $2,119 to $6,480 at public four-year
colleges, representing increases of 160% and 206%, respectively. TRENDS IN COLLEGE
PRICING, supra note 39, at 9, fig.4. R
151. Direct Stafford Loans, supra note 39. The loan limits discussed are for depen- R
dent undergraduate students. For independent students, who are not claimed as depen-
dents by their parents, the maximum available amounts are larger: $9,500 for first-
year students, $10,500 for second-year students, and $12,500 for more senior students,
up to a grand total of $57,500. Id.
152. What You Should Know Before You Apply, FUNDING EDUC. BEYOND HIGH
SCHOOL, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/publications/student_
guide/2009-2010/english/typesofFSA_loans_2.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). Grad-
uate and professional students can borrow up to $20,500 per year, up to a total of
$138,500. See Direct Stafford Loans, supra note 39. R
153. See supra note 148. R
154. See, e.g., 2010–11 Registration Fees, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY: OFFICE OF THE
REGISTRAR, http://registrar.berkeley.edu/Registration/feesched.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2010). The Berkeley campus for the 2010–11 academic year charges $6,230.75 per
semester to resident undergraduate students. This figure does not include living ex-
penses or the cost of books, travel, and other expenses. Eight semesters at that price
would cost more than the maximum amount available to a dependent undergraduate
through the federal Stafford loan program.
155. Private loan volume grew nearly sevenfold between the 1998–99 academic year
and the 2007–08 academic year, rising from $3.3 billion to $22.3 billion; it fell in
2008–09 to $11 billion. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2009, supra note 2, at 6. The more R
recent decline followed the credit crunch of 2008, which had severe effects on many
student loan providers. The gap between federal loan amounts available and the cost
of higher education has also led to increased use of federal PLUS loans taken out by
parents of undergraduate students (and by graduate and professional students on their
own). These loans have fixed interest rates, like other federal loans, but the rate is
higher than that on the popular Stafford loan that undergraduates can use without
parental help. There are other disadvantages to the PLUS loan. See supra note 95 and R
accompanying text; see also infra note 229 and accompanying text (describing in- R
creasing use of PLUS loans).
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Companies that make private loans have benefitted historically
from favorable treatment of education debts by the Bankruptcy
Code156 and the absence of federal oversight. Essentially, lenders
make unsecured consumer loans on terms that are not easily moni-
tored, and borrowers cannot easily void the obligations through per-
sonal bankruptcy. The following discussion summarizes the risks of
private loan borrowing, the bad incentives that result from loan com-
panies’ operation in a regulatory blind spot, and the problems created
by the difficulty of canceling debt in bankruptcy proceedings. Given
these issues, and the fact that private loans are not eligible for federal
forgiveness or flexible repayment programs, reliance on private debt
means that more borrowers find themselves unable to pursue their ca-
reer ambitions, especially in the area of public service.
1. Rates and Terms
There are three general problems for student borrowers using pri-
vate loans. It is difficult to ascertain loan terms ahead of time in order
to engage in comparison shopping, those terms are typically worse and
repayment options less flexible than those offered by federal aid pro-
grams, and it may be too easy for students to borrow more than they
need.
While the terms of federal loans are standardized and relatively
straightforward, the terms of individual private loans—which the De-
partment of Education does not oversee157—can be as diverse as those
of home loans. When New York attorney general Andrew Cuomo
spoke to members of Congress about private loans, he described them
as the “Wild West” of student lending because there are few rules and
few monitors to enforce them.158
The terms of private student loans are almost always worse for
students than those of federal loans. The interest rates on such loans
are not fixed; they fluctuate over the life of the loan, changing stu-
156. In 2010, Congress took up a proposal to change the special status of private
student loans in bankruptcy proceedings. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. R
157. Accountability for the Department of Education’s Oversight of Student Loans
and the Reading First Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Margaret M. Spellings, Sec’y of Educ. of the United
States), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/hearings/2007/05/accountability-for-the-
departm.shtml [hereinafter Margaret Spellings Testimony].
158. Paying for College: The Role of Private Student Lending: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous,. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of
Andrew M. Cuomo, Att’y Gen. of the State of New York), available at http://banking.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=9196c024-c06d-
424a-a3f3-e2d456133fa1.
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dents’ repayment obligations. A student has a hard time determining
the terms of private loans in advance because lenders base loan terms
on the individual applicant’s credit history. As a result, would-be bor-
rowers must complete a loan application process in order to learn the
rate and other terms that a lender would offer. To engage in compari-
son shopping, borrowers must apply to several lenders. Each lender
typically runs a credit check on the applicant, and the series of inquir-
ies may hurt the applicant’s credit rating, which in turn often leads to
less favorable loan terms.159
When they complete their educational program, either graduating
or dropping out, borrowers entering repayment may find loan compa-
nies inflexible. Whether a lender will adjust the repayment terms of a
private loan to accommodate a borrower experiencing financial diffi-
culty depends on the largesse of that lender. Federal loan repayment
assistance, state incentives, and most colleges’ forgiveness programs
do not cover private loans. The loans are ineligible for the govern-
ment’s extended and/or income-based repayment.
Finally, companies that make private loans are by definition not
covered by caps on total borrowing imposed by federal programs,
which permit students to borrow no more than the total “cost of at-
tendance,” a term that refers not only to tuition, room, and board but
also includes an allowance for travel, books, and other expenses. Lim-
its on private loan borrowing are generally at the discretion of lenders.
For the reasons discussed below, lenders may have little incentive to
help students avoid excessive debt.160
2. What, Me Worry?
Many private lenders do not keep the student loans they have
made on their own balance sheets. To raise money for more loans,
they sell student debt in packages to investors or to other, larger lend-
ers. Because they do not hold onto the obligations, smaller lenders
have little incentive to evaluate carefully borrowers’ ability to repay.
159. Ron Lieber, Danger Lurks When Shopping for Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 2008, at C1.
160. Although I have raised a number of concerns about use of private student loans,
I acknowledge that some borrowers have good reasons for using this form of credit to
pay for higher education. Parents may for some reason refuse to fill out the forms
necessary to apply for federal loans, for example. In addition, though I have summa-
rized the characteristics of private loans relative to federal loans here, it is also the
case that borrowers have both good and bad experiences with lenders of any type,
making loans of any type. Some students have certainly complained about the treat-
ment their federal loans have received. See Testimonials, STUDENT LOAN JUSTICE,
http://www.studentloanjustice.org/victims.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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While larger lenders are more likely to hold onto loans they have
made or purchased, they also operate other businesses that reduce the
impact of borrower default and that, as a result, reduce the incentive to
verify borrowers’ ability to repay. Some loan companies earn money
from offering default aversion services, intended to keep borrowers on
track to pay off their debts, while others operate collections businesses
that pursue students who default.161 Through these ancillary busi-
nesses, lenders can make money off of loans that become delinquent
and go into default, as they charge fees and impose penalties for at-
tempting to restructure borrowers’ debts or trying to track them down
and compel payment.
3. What, Me Worry? Part Two
Companies that make private student loans benefit from the spe-
cial status given to education debt under the federal Bankruptcy
Code.162 Lenders have little incentive to limit the size of students’
loans because borrowers cannot easily avoid repayment obligations.163
For indebted students who have graduated or otherwise left
school, bankruptcy may not afford the “fresh start” it is intended to
161. Many large lenders perform collections and other services. SLM Corp., for ex-
ample, “earn[s] fee income from a number of services including student loan and
guarantee servicing, loan default aversion and defaulted loan collections.” SLM Corp.
2009 Annual Report, supra note 10, at 2. Nelnet, another large student loan company, R
“provid[es] software and data center services, borrower and loan updates, default
aversion tracking services, claim processing services, and post-default collection ser-
vices to guaranty agencies.” Nelnet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Dec. 31,
2009), available at http://www.nelnetinvestors.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1437749-
10-526.
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006), which prohibits a debtor from discharging a
debt:
[U]nless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents,
for—
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in
whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as de-
fined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred
by a debtor who is an individual . . . .
163. The Supreme Court recently ruled in favor of a borrower who attempted to
restructure his student loan debts through bankruptcy. However, the Court did not
address the thorny question of what constitutes undue hardship. The Court based its
decision on procedural steps taken in the case. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378, 1380–81 (2010).
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provide most debtors.164 Borrowers cannot obtain a discharge, or can-
cellation, of their obligation to repay their student loans165 without
showing that repayment would constitute an “undue hardship.”166
The Bankruptcy Code does not define what level of hardship is
undue. However, the Second Circuit has established a three-part test,
adopted in several jurisdictions,167 which debtors must meet to
demonstrate undue hardship. The test requires that a debtor show:
[T]hat the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her depen-
dents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances
exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans;
and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the
loans.168
In practice, these factors do not provide clear guidance to judges
or information to debtors. According to research by Rafael I. Pardo
and Michelle R. Lacey, different judges interpret “minimal” differ-
ently, make different assessments of a debtor’s future earning poten-
tial, and draw different conclusions about what constitutes a good faith
effort to repay.169 Because the outcomes of proceedings are affected
by extra-legal factors, such as the identity of the judge, Pardo and
Lacey suggest that borrowers cannot predict the outcome of litigation
on the question of dischargeability of their loans.170 Pardo and Lacey
164. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1985) (analyzing reasons for permitting the cancellation
of debt through bankruptcy proceedings).
165. The Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish between federal and private student
loans. While a public policy argument exists for disallowing discharge of federal stu-
dent loans subsidized by taxpayers, the rationale for prohibiting discharge of private
loans benefitting banks and other lenders is less clear.
166. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
167. Nine circuit courts of appeal have adopted the Second Circuit’s test. See In re
Nash, 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006) (summarizing the different views among
appellate courts). The First and Eighth Circuits have not. Id.; see also Bronsdon v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 435 B.R. 791, 800–01 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Sept. 21, 2010)
(declining to adopt the Second Circuit’s test).
168. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987) (per curiam); see also Pardo & Lacey, supra note 3, at 195. R
169. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy
Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 405, 520 (2005) (raising the concern that “a judge, in making the determination
of whether to discharge educational debt, will invariably impose his or her personal
views on the proper role of bankruptcy, on the proper role of the fresh start, and on the
type of debtor who is worthy of relief embodied in the Bankruptcy Code”).
170. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 3, at 190. (“By signaling that undue hardship dis- R
charge litigation is a crapshoot, the doctrine produces noise rather than clarity.”).
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speculate that debtors may too readily go to trial to contest payment
obligations, needlessly incurring litigation costs. “These are the
hallmarks of a system that has run amok,” the authors conclude.171
The combination of litigation costs and the uncertainty of out-
comes may deter borrowers from trying to get rid of their loan obliga-
tions, even when they have legitimate reasons to seek discharge.
Rising student debt burdens generally, and private debts in particular,
mean more people are likely to find themselves in untenable financial
situations with uncertain prospects of relief, even through the painful
process of bankruptcy.
C. The Student Loan Scandals of 2007
The tension between the interest of loan companies in making
money and the goal of federal aid in promoting access to higher edu-
cation became visible as a result of a series of scandals involving stu-
dent loans early in 2007.172 The New York Times published an article
detailing benefits that student loan providers offered to colleges’ fi-
nancial aid offices and administrators.173 The article stated that lend-
ers’ gifts of travel, monetary donations for scholarships, and other
benefits were offered in “hopes that [the colleges would] steer stu-
dents their way.”174 The article highlighted the critical role financial
aid officers played in directing students to particular lenders. Many
colleges recommended “preferred lenders,”175 or loan companies and
banks from which students attending the colleges could borrow. The
benefits offered to aid administrators raised the question of whether
students were being directed by colleges to borrow from particular
lenders based not on the terms of loans, but on the quality of the gifts
171. Id. at 235.
172. See, e.g., Larry Abramson, College Loan Scandal May Touch Many Schools
(Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=9501428; Kelly Field, The Selling of Student Loans, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., June 1, 2007, at A15; Jonathan D. Glater, Offering Perks, Lenders Court Col-
leges’ Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at A1; Daniel Golden & David Armstrong,
Lenders Ply Aid Officials at Schools with Free Stuff, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2007, at
B1; Lisa Myers, NBC Nightly News: Student Financial Aid Scandal Grows (NBC
television May 10, 2007, 7:33 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18598574/; Amit
R. Paley, Federal Overseer of Student Loans Invested in Lender, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 2007, at D1; Paul Pringle, Probe into Student Lending Spotlights Dual Role of
U.S., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at B1.
173. Glater, supra note 172. R
174. Id. Gifts offered to colleges and financial aid officials included a Caribbean
vacation, iPods awarded through raffles at conferences, and monetary bonuses to col-
leges based on loan volume. Id.
175. Id.
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loan companies provided.176 One financial aid administrator, L. Kath-
arine Harrington of the University of Southern California, observed, “I
don’t think you have to be a bona fide ethicist to recognize the poten-
tial for a conflict of interest.”177
Although HEA prohibited loan companies from offering “induce-
ments” to colleges as a lure for federal loan borrowers, the prohibition
was not often enforced.178 For two decades prior to 2007, the Depart-
ment of Education only twice used its power to punish lenders for
offering improper inducements.179 Moreover, the prohibition did not
apply to private loans.
Financial aid officials at institutions that had arrangements with
lenders insisted that they had negotiated more favorable private180
loan terms for borrowers.181 According to the officials, those better
loan terms, not the gifts or other benefits provided by lenders, ex-
plained which companies were included on lists of preferred lenders.
Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to verify the officials’ claims.
The terms of private loans are indirectly available only through public
company regulatory filings that reveal aggregate, average interest rates
on portfolios of loans.182
In the weeks after the article ran, investigators in the New York
attorney general’s office looked into the practices of loan companies
176. See id. A new entrant in the student loan industry, MyRichUncle, had run a
series of advertisements earlier in the year, challenging the objectivity and the motives
of financial aid offices. The ads suggested that students put a series of questions to
financial aid administrators, to ascertain whether their recommendations were unbi-
ased. See id.
177. See id.
178. A 1986 amendment to HEA barred lenders from offering “points, premiums,
payments or other inducements,” in order to lure applicants for guaranteed loans. See
20 U.S.C. § 1085(d)(5)(A) (2006). However, an investigation by the Government Ac-
countability Office in 2007 found that the Department of Education “has no oversight
tools in place designed to proactively detect potential instances of lenders providing
improper inducements,” such as gifts to schools in exchange for preferred status on a
school’s suggested lender list, “or schools limiting borrower choice of lender.” U. S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-750, FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN
PROGRAM: INCREASED DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT OF LENDER AND
SCHOOL ACTIVITIES NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE PROGRAM COMPLIANCE 2 (2007), http:/
/www.gao.gov/new.items/d07750.pdf [hereinafter GAO-07-750].
179. GAO-07-750, supra note 178. R
180. Lenders usually did not offer federal loan terms that differed from the maxi-
mum levels set by Congress, although they could have offered lower rates.
181. Glater, supra note 172. R
182. For example, in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sallie
Mae disclosed that the overall net interest earned on its private loans was 6.8% in
2009, down from nearly 12% two years earlier. Of course some students are paying
much more and some are paying less. SLM Corp. 2009 Annual Report, supra note 10, R
at 55, F-32.
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and into ties between lenders and college officials.183 When Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer became governor, Andrew Cuomo, his succes-
sor, seized on the issue.184 Investigations by journalists and state attor-
neys general uncovered a variety of suspect relationships between loan
providers and financial aid offices.185
Some colleges and lenders had “revenue sharing” agreements,
under which the lender paid the college more money as students at
that college borrowed more.186 The colleges could then use that
money as they saw fit, perhaps to extend more financial aid to needy
students or to international students unable to participate in federal
loan programs. Most likely because most students rely on financial aid
offices for information about loan products and for advice in choosing
a lender187 instead of shopping around for the best deal on their own,
the arrangements targeted the college officials. For lenders, the re-
wards could be significant: lenders whom college aid officials recom-
mend can capture ninety percent of loan volume at an institution.188
A few financial aid officials held stock in loan companies whose
services they were in a position to recommend to student borrow-
ers.189 Some accepted trinkets and junkets offered by lenders; some
served on lenders’ “advisory committees,”190 which met in desirable
locales. For example, the director of financial aid at Lasell College in
Newton, Mass., was accused of taking “trips to Disney’s Yacht and
Beach Club Resort in Florida and Sanctuary on Camelback Mountain
in Arizona through her involvement with Citizens[ ] [Bank’s] ‘Educa-
tional Finance Advisory Board.’”191
183. Kathy Chu, Cuomo Makes a Name for Himself in Replacing Spitzer, USA TO-
DAY, Apr. 24, 2007, at B3.
184. Glater, supra note 11. R
185. Examining Unethical Practices in the Student Loan Industry: Hearing before
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 26 (2007) (statement of Andrew M.
Cuomo, Att’y General of New York) [hereinafter Cuomo House Testimony], available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&
docid=f:34603.pdf, at 8.
186. Id. at 4.
187. Glater, supra note 11, at B6 (“[S]tudents rarely shop around and tend to rely on R
guidance from a university’s financial aid office.”).
188. Cuomo House Testimony, supra note 185, at 8. R
189. Id. at 5; see also Jonathan D. Glater, U. of Texas Fires Officer over Tie to Loan
Company, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A13 (describing the decision of the Univer-
sity of Texas to fire a financial aid official who held stock in the parent company of a
student loan provider).
190. Cuomo House Testimony, supra note 185 at 8. R
191. Todd Wallack, Lasell College Agrees to Settle Lender Gift Allegations, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2010, at B5.
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Some lenders also provided services on campus to facilitate the
making of loans. They paid printing costs for financial aid offices, for
example.192 Employees of loan companies worked in college financial
aid offices to help college administrators process applications from
student borrowers.193 Lenders even operated call centers on behalf of
college aid offices; call center employees taking student borrowers’
calls did not disclose that they were not affiliated with the college.194
In each instance, investigators concluded, lenders sought to encourage
college officials to steer student borrowers to specific loan companies.
In the most striking development, investigators revealed that a
Department of Education official who was responsible for oversight of
lenders participating in the federal loan program had held stock in one
such lender.195 According to Cuomo, the Department of Education
was “asleep at the switch.”196
D. The Legislative Response
The swirl of publicity197 around the student lending industry
prompted several investigations. Congress held hearings and eventu-
ally passed legislation aimed at curbing lending industry practices.
Such legislation would have been unthinkable in prior years, not just
because of the lack of attention to the industry, but also because of the
readiness of its biggest players to wage war through lobbying and
litigation.198
192. Cuomo House Testimony, supra note 185, at 8. R
193. Id. at 12.
194. Id. at 8; see also Jonathan D. Glater, Colleges Hiring Lenders to Field Queries
on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at A1 (reporting that operators working at call
centers run by loan companies did not disclose their affiliation).
195. The penalty imposed on this official was suspension with pay. Jonathan D.
Glater & Karen W. Arenson, Federal Official Put on Leave in Student Loan Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at A10; Jonathan D. Glater & Karen W. Arenson, U.S.
Official Had Disclosed His Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at A13.
196. See Cuomo House Testimony, supra note 185, at 10. R
197. While The New York Times was first, several other major news organizations
jumped on different pieces of the scandals involving the student loan industry. See,
e.g., Abramson, supra note 172; Field, supra note 172; Golden & Armstrong, supra R
note 172; Myers, supra note 172; Paley, supra note 172; Pringle, supra note 172. R
198. See Glater & Arenson, supra note 124, at A25 (regarding lender efforts to hob- R
ble the direct loan program); see also Waldman, supra note 128, at 133–37 (discuss- R
ing the lending industry’s efforts to prevent the creation of the direct loan program in
the first place); accord supra note 140 and accompanying text (describing lenders’ R
tactics in competition with the federal direct loan program).
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Reform199 came through the Higher Education Opportunity Act
of 2008 (HEOA), which reauthorized the HEA.200 HEOA incorpo-
rated provisions championed by Representative George Miller, a Cali-
fornia Democrat, and Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a Massachusetts
Democrat. Both had been critical of student loan industry conduct in
the past but had not had the votes to move legislation addressing the
problems they had identified. After the 2006 election cycle, however,
Representative Miller became chairman of the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, while Senator Kennedy—an advocate of greater ac-
cess to higher education for decades—became chairman of the Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. The election results gave
them the leadership and votes; the scandals gave them the justification
to take on student loan companies.
In HEOA, lawmakers imposed restrictions on lenders and, in
some cases, colleges, to rein in exploitation of students and to restrain
tuition increases. Although the legislation imposed a variety of disclo-
sure requirements on colleges and lenders and modestly raised grant
aid available to the neediest students, it did not raise maximum loan
amounts significantly. The legislation consisted of a series of rela-
tively narrow, precise responses to abuses uncovered by the recent
investigations into the conduct of the student loan industry.
The law required that colleges disclose their reasons for designat-
ing certain loan companies as “preferred” federal loan providers for
students and issue a statement that students could borrow from other
loan providers.201 It ordered companies making federal loans to pro-
vide “thorough and accurate loan information on such loan[s] to the
borrower in simple and understandable terms,” advising borrowers
about loan terms and various available repayment plans, about their
right to change repayment plans, about avoiding default, and about
sources of loan repayment assistance.202 The bill barred lenders from
using institutions’ names, emblems, logos, or mascots in marketing
materials. It also prevented lenders from using their access to the Na-
199. Congress also passed CCRA as the financial aid scandals were discovered, but
the legislation focused on increasing grants to the neediest students, reducing interest
rates on certain need-based federal loans, and expanding an income-based repayment
program and public service loan repayment assistance program for graduates. College
Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 102, 121 Stat. 784 (2007)
(increasing Pell grants), § 201 (reducing federal loan interest rates), and § 203, 121
Stat. 792 (describing income-based repayment).
200. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 120, 122 Stat. 3078,
3117–3126 (2008) (governing relationships between lenders and educational
institutions).
201. Id. § 120.
202. Id. § 434(a).
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tional Student Loan Data System, a Department of Education database
that contained detailed information on borrowers and their finances, as
a tool to identify potential borrowers.
The legislation also made it easier for parents who fell behind on
home loan payments to qualify for a parental PLUS loan for a depen-
dent student, a move that responded to the wave of foreclosures that
spread across the country as the credit crisis of 2008 worsened.203 In
an attempt to curtail college tuition increases, HEOA required that the
Department of Education annually publish lists of institutions that
charged the highest tuition and fees, raised tuition and fees the most,
and charged the highest net tuition (i.e., tuition and fees, less average
financial aid awards).204 The law prohibited the business practices in-
volving private student loans, expressly barring lenders from provid-
ing gifts to colleges, paying them bonuses, or sharing revenue with
them.205
The legislation also addressed disclosure concerns involving pri-
vate student loans by amending the federal Truth in Lending Act206 to
impose a series of requirements on companies making such loans.
HEOA required disclosure of the following basic information to
borrowers:
(A) [T]he potential range of rates of interest applicable to the pri-
vate education loan;
(B) whether the rate of interest applicable to the private education
loan is fixed or variable;
(C) limitations on interest rate adjustments, both in terms of fre-
quency and amount, or the lack thereof, if applicable . . .
(E) potential finance charges, late fees, penalties, and adjustments
to principal, based on defaults or late payments of the borrower;
(F) fees or range of fees applicable to the private education
loan.207
Unfortunately, these disclosures are inadequate. The law does not
require lenders to report the size or terms of their private loans to
financial aid administrators or the Department of Education. Without
that information, it is very difficult for officials to track total student
203. Id. § 424.
204. Id. § 111.
205. Id. § 493.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1968). The private loan term disclosure requirements
were codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(e).
207. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 1021(a), 122 Stat.
3078, 3126 (2008). The law also subjects lenders to civil liability for failure to provide
required disclosures. Id. § 1012.
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borrowing and ensure that lending terms are fair.208 Without informa-
tion about the characteristics of those applicants who get specific
rates, disclosure of a range of interest rates that a borrower might face
is of little use.209 As it stands, only after a student has applied for a
private loan does a lender inform the potential borrower of the rate
that the lender intends to impose.210
Students should know what their peers are being charged for
comparable loans, as should aid administrators. While students may
not pay attention to loan terms until they begin repayment years after
signing master promissory notes to cover their college costs, financial
aid administrators should. Aid officials understand the implications of
different interest rates in a manner that student borrowers, who may
have little experience with credit, may not. If aid officials can learn
private loan terms, they will be able to advise students on the conse-
quences of different types of borrowing and help them design a fis-
cally responsible budget. Finally, the Department of Education should
have the ability to monitor rates and fees imposed.211
At a minimum, lenders should be required to disclose the average
interest rate charged to each quartile of borrowers, so that prospective
borrowers can see, for example, that one-fourth of borrowers face a
rate of ten percent, one-fourth a rate of twelve percent, and so on. The
disclosure should also include the average credit score for each quar-
208. It can be a serious problem for students if financial aid administrators learn of
private loans after the funds have been disbursed. Colleges are required to reduce the
amount of financial aid they provide—whether through grants, federal loan programs
or other sources—if the total amount of borrowing by students exceeds the cost of
attendance. Instead of putting on lenders the duty of reporting private loan borrowing
by students, the law requires lenders to obtain a “form developed by the Secretary of
Education . . . signed by the applicant.” Higher Education Opportunity Act § 1021,
122 Stat. 3078, 3485 (adding § 128(e) to § 1638(e) of the Truth in Lending Act).
Separately, HEOA provides that a “private educational lender . . . has no liability
under this section for failure to comply with section 128(e)(3)).” Id. § 1012(a)(3)(j),
122 Stat. 3078, 3482. So there remains neither a requirement that lenders report stu-
dents’ private borrowing to financial aid offices and no penalty directed at a lender for
failure to ensure that a college is informed of all that a student borrows.
209. Rates charged by some lenders on private student loans exceed fifteen percent.
Jonathan D. Glater, New York Art College Canceled Deal with Lender After Learning
of High Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2007, at A17.
210. HEOA imposes a number of disclosure requirements on lenders. The law re-
quires, for example, that lenders disclose “expenses paid or provided” to college offi-
cials. Higher Education Opportunity Act § 120, 122 Stat. 3078, 3121. However, these
disclosure requirements apply only to “any loan made, insured, or guaranteed under
part B of title IV,” thus specifically excluding private loans. Id.
211. In all of the investigations of the student loan industry in 2007, it never became
clear which regulatory agency, if any, tracked the rates charged to student borrowers
on private loans.
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tile. This approach preserves student privacy while also enabling fi-
nancial aid administrators to evaluate how well lenders are serving
their students.
Additional disclosures, however, would not solve all the
problems confronting students paying for higher education. Unfortu-
nately, in its legislative response to the student loan scandals, Con-
gress passed up an opportunity to tackle the more fundamental
challenge of keeping higher education within reach. The legislation
only requires the Department of Education to make public the names
of colleges that raise tuition the most.212 No individual college or uni-
versity has an incentive to reduce tuition because steps to lower costs,
such as cutting back on campus amenities, hurt an institution’s stand-
ing relative to its competitors.213
Lawmakers again failed to address the broader problem of col-
lege costs when the financial crisis of 2008 forced them to revisit stu-
dent loans. Instead, Congress acted to prop up214 the student aid
system, which was reeling as a result of investor fears about the qual-
ity of securities backed by student loans. While securities linked to
mortgage debts received the most attention—and indeed, U.S. out-
standing mortgage debts dwarf student loan balances—the crunch se-
riously affected student loan providers.215 Unable to sell either
guaranteed or private loans to investors, some lenders simply stopped
making loans.216 Concerned that students might not be able to borrow
for school, Congress acted.
212. Higher Education Opportunity Act § 111 (amending Part C of title I of 20
U.S.C. § 1015 to add § 132(c), requiring the education secretary to compile “college
affordability and transparency lists”).
213. Colin Diver, the president of Reed College, said no college wanted to be first to
cut the “country club” aspects of college life. “‘If we’re going to change our ways,
we’re really going to need to be pushed,’ Mr. Diver said, referring to colleges gener-
ally. ‘It’s not going to well up from within.’” See Jonathan D. Glater, College in Need
Closes a Door to Needy Students, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1.
214. “The Education Department agreed in the waning days of the Bush administra-
tion to expand its commitment to buy student loans to keep the market working, much
as the government has agreed to buy up all manner of loans, from mortgages to com-
mercial paper, to unfreeze various credit markets.” Jonathan D. Glater, Big U.S. Role
in Lending to Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at B1.
215. Jonathan D. Glater, A Lender Halts U.S.-Backed Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2008, at C1 (describing how “tight credit markets are affecting the industry,
with some lenders warning that it could be more difficult and more costly for many
students to obtain college loans for the 2008–9 academic year”).
216. Id.; see also Mark Kantrowitz, Lender Layoffs and Loan Program Suspensions,
FINAID.ORG, http://www.finaid.org/loans/lenderlayoffs.phtml (last visited Oct. 6,
2010) (listing loan companies that suspended making loans since August 2007, in
some cases as a result of the financial crisis).
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Under the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of
2008217 Congress authorized the federal Department of Education to
support the industry by taking a variety of steps, including purchasing
guaranteed loans from lenders to give them the capital to make new
loans.218 The law, which raised maximum federal loan amounts to
their current levels,219 also empowered the Department of Education
to advance money to guaranty agencies220 so that, if necessary, they
could make federal loans as lenders of last resort.221 In another bill
passed a few months later, Congress extended the department’s au-
thority to aid the lending industry, allowing the government to buy
guaranteed loans from loan companies through the 2009-10 academic
year.
In March 2010, Congress attached sweeping changes to federal
student loan programs to health care legislation. Lawmakers voted to
end the guaranteed loan program, redirecting all federal loan borrow-
ers to the direct loan program.222 The vote ended “one of the fiercest
lobbying fights in Washington.”223 Some of the savings224 the bill
would generate would contribute to funds for slightly larger grants to
the neediest students. The maximum Pell grant was set to rise to
$5,900 in the 2019–20 academic year from $5,550 in the 2010–11
academic year.225 Yet this increase is “minuscule, compared with the
steep, inexorable rise in tuition for public and private colleges
alike.”226
The elimination of the guaranteed loan program does not solve
the fundamental problem of cost for students and families, who likely
care less about the source of loans and more about the amount they
can borrow and the terms of repayment. The political battles over the
channel through which loan funds travel, either directly from the gov-
217. Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act, Pub. L. No. 110-227, 122
Stat. 740 (2008).
218. Id. § 7, 122 Stat. 740, 746.
219. Id. § 2, 122 Stat. 740, 740-742.
220. Guaranty agencies are the intermediate entities, between lenders and the federal
government, that essentially insure lenders against defaulted loans. See supra note
124 and accompanying text. R
221. Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act § 6.
222. Herszenhorn & Lewin, supra note 15, at A1. R
223. Id.
224. Cost savings were realized by getting rid of the subsidy payment—really, the
guaranteed rate of return on federal loans—to lenders. The subsidy had been an incen-
tive to get lenders to make student loans in the first place. See supra note 124 and R
accompanying text (describing Congress’s retention of the power to set interest rates
charged to borrowers and paid to lenders under the guaranteed loan program).
225. Herszenhorn & Lewin, supra note 15, at A1. R
226. Id.
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ernment or through private corporate intermediaries, have precluded
serious discussion about how best to revise federal aid programs.
After the onset of the financial crisis of 2008, it became more
difficult and costly for students and their families to use private loans
to pay for college because lenders making the loans adopted tighter
credit standards. According to estimates by the College Board, be-
cause students have not had easy access to private loans,227 the vol-
ume of private loans made in the 2008–09 academic year declined for
the first time in more than a decade to $11 billion—less than half of
the volume in 2007–08.228
For those concerned about the dangers private loans pose to bor-
rowers, the decline is good news. But the drop does not mean that
overall indebtedness is falling. It may indicate that fewer students
from less affluent backgrounds are enrolling in college.
The decline in private loan borrowing paralleled a slight increase
in use of PLUS loans, available both to graduate students and to par-
ents of undergraduate students.229 The increase is not nearly enough to
offset the decline in private borrowing. Nevertheless, more students
and parents may be turning to PLUS loans, which were already gain-
ing in popularity, because they cannot get a private loan. PLUS loans
carry a fixed interest rate and, like other federal loans and unlike pri-
vate loans, offer some flexibility in repayment terms. However, under-
graduate parent PLUS loans are not eligible for the income-based
repayment plans available for other types of federal loans.230 While
PLUS loans help fill the gap between the full cost of attending college
and what students can borrow on their own, PLUS loans do not pull
college graduates out from under a debt overhang. Instead, the loans
push students’ parents under it, too.
227. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2009, supra note 2, at 6 (observing that one reason R
federal loan borrowing “is growing [is] as a result of difficulties in private credit
markets”). Private loan volume fell further in the 2009–10 academic year, to $7.7
billion. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2010, supra note 40, at 10 tbl.1. R
228. Id.
229. Id. PLUS loan volume rose in 2008–09 to $11.8 billion from $11.1 billion the
previous year. Clearly the increase does not make up for all of the decline in private
lending. Total federal loan volume rose to $85 billion in the 2008–09 academic year
from $71 billion a year earlier.
230. Income-Based Repayment Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/
PORTALSWebApp/students/english/IBRPlan.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
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III.
NOT ALL DEBTS ARE EQUAL
Barring loan companies from offering inducements to financial
aid administrators repeated and made more specific a prohibition that
had already been ignored.231 It did not eliminate the incentive for pri-
vate lenders to develop tactics to build their student lending busi-
nesses.232 Nor did it reduce graduates’ indebtedness.
Broader change is needed. The laws governing student lending
should be changed. Congress should pass legislation enabling most
college students who need to borrow to be able to pay by drawing only
on federal student aid programs. This would mean tripling the maxi-
mum amounts available to an undergraduate, raising the total available
to each student to nearly $100,000. Even in the absence of other grant
aid, that amount of money would permit students to use federal loans
exclusively to pay the full cost of attending a public flagship univer-
sity, or at least half the current cost of even the most expensive private
institution, which would have more financial aid resources available
than public universities to help with the balance.
Many students would continue to receive grant aid from institu-
tions they attend and from state and/or federal aid programs, so hope-
fully most borrowers would not need to use all of the available federal
loan money to pay for college. Far fewer students would need to draw
on private loans, and permitting students to borrow more through fed-
eral programs would address the problems caused by debt discussed in
Part I.
This part has two sections. The first outlines the benefits of al-
lowing students to borrow larger amounts through federal loan pro-
grams and explains how expanded programs can both restore the
democracy-enhancing effects of higher education and mitigate the per-
nicious effects of debt. The second section identifies and responds to
possible objections to raising maximum loan amounts.
A. Borrowing More Can Be Good
Increasing the amount of money students may borrow through
federal loan programs so that students can use the loans to pay tuition,
regardless of the type of college attended,233 would increase access to
231. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. R
232. The Department of Education under the Bush Administration stated that it did
not have authority to regulate private loans. Margaret Spellings Testimony, supra note
157. R
233. This argument reflects the view that, ideally, a student should be able to choose
a college without cost playing a deciding role. Some might disagree with this view
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safer loan products for more students. Given existing loan repayment
assistance programs, such an initiative would also make it easier for
borrowers to choose the careers they most strongly wish to pursue,
especially in public service.
1. Learning to Love Debt
Making federal loans more palatable to those averse to borrowing
requires two steps. First, existing federal loan products should be des-
ignated initially as grants, but grants with a twist: if borrowers do not
pursue public service careers, then the grants become loans.234 This is
effectively what NYU School of Law did for some students when it
offered tuition subsidies—grants—to students who planned to pursue
public interest careers. If participating students did not end up working
in the public interest for a sufficient period of time, they had to repay
the subsidy as if it were a loan. By providing funds in the form of a
grant, albeit one that the recipient could lose, the program attracted
more students interested in public service.235
Second, the Department of Education should launch a broad and
sustained publicity campaign about the expanded loan programs. The
goal would be to ensure that potential borrowers understood that they
would be saddled with student debt only if they did not pursue public
interest careers.
As students realized how much they could borrow through fed-
eral sources, an incidental benefit of effective dissemination of infor-
mation about the virtues of federal loan programs would be a
reduction in the use of private loans. Some studies have found that
student borrowers in the current system often do not take advantage of
federal loan options available to them, suggesting that they do not re-
and argue that students should only be assured they can attend college rather than any
(or a specific) college.
234. The program’s design—or “choice architecture” in the framework advocated by
Cass Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler—is intended to encourage students to pursue
public service jobs, at least until they have earned their grants, the equivalent of re-
paying their loans. The key is that the change in default costs taxpayers little, because
students still may choose private sector jobs that pay well and repay loans, while still
making a tremendous difference as what Sunstein and Thaler call a “nudge” to lead
students in directions that benefit society at large. See CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H.
THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 3
(2008). The federal TEACH Grant Program uses this reversible grant structure, too;
grants paid to teachers who do not complete their teaching obligations become federal
student loans. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TEACH GRANT PROGRAM, http://studentaid.ed.
gov/students/attachments/siteresources/TEACHGrant10-11.pdf.
235. See supra Part I.B.2.ii (discussing the natural experiment in financial aid no-
menclature at New York University School of Law).
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alize the benefits of federal aid and the risks and costs of private bor-
rowing.236 A broad effort to publicize the advantages of federal loans
would save students money under both the current system and the en-
hanced system I propose.237
2. The Wheel has Already Been Invented
Allowing students to borrow more through federal programs
would afford them the ability to participate in existing flexible repay-
ment plans available through the government, such as extended repay-
ment and income-based repayment plans. It would no longer matter
that repayment assistance programs omit private loans because stu-
dents would not need to take out private loans in the first place. In
many, if not most cases,238 they would be able to pay for everything
using only federal aid programs eligible for loan repayment assistance.
Federal loans offer borrowers certainty about costs: currently, in-
terest rates are fixed for the life of a loan. Raising maximum loan
amounts would also substantially increase the reach and, correspond-
ingly, the appeal, of existing public service repayment assistance pro-
grams, by permitting them to cover all of a student’s debt, without
requiring the creation of a new national service initiative. Thus, al-
lowing students to borrow more through federal programs has the sur-
prising result of reducing the degree to which debt may skew career
and life choices.
236. According to the Project on Student Debt, an initiative of the Institute for Col-
lege Access & Success, a nonprofit independent research and policy organization that
tracks student borrowing, “[a]lmost two-thirds (64%) of private loan borrowers in
2007–08 borrowed less than they could have in [federal] Stafford loans.” THE PRO-
JECT ON STUDENT DEBT, PRIVATE LOANS: FACTS AND TRENDS (2009), http://projecton
studentdebt.org/files/pub/private_loan_facts_trends_09.pdf [hereinafter THE PROJECT
ON STUDENT DEBT] .
237. To be clear, while federal loan programs do offer clear benefits to indebted
graduates, they can still be very difficult to deal with for those students who default.
The government’s collection powers include wage garnishment and more; the Su-
preme Court in 2005 upheld the government’s power to seize a portion of social se-
curity payments to offset unpaid student loan obligations, even after the ten-year
statute of limitations under the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. § 3716(e)(1),
had run. Lockhart v. U.S., 546 U.S. 142, 145 (2005).
238. Although a college’s sticker price might still exceed the amount students could
borrow through expanded federal loan programs, for many students the sticker price is
not the actual price. The College Board estimated that in the 2010-11 academic year,
the average “net price” students actually pay in tuition and fees is less than $12,000
per year at private, nonprofit colleges—less than half the average, published price.
TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 39, at 15, fig. 7. R
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3. Doing What They Love
Providing financial assistance in the form of a grant also ad-
dresses the problem of career misdirection caused by repayment obli-
gations. Because at the time they contemplated their careers students
would not have any student loans, concern about how to cope with
debt would not drive their decisions. Providing grant aid, even aid that
may vanish if students make certain choices about their jobs after
graduation, applies the lessons of the NYU School of Law and “Anon
U” experiments, in which elimination of loans—not just assistance
repaying them—encouraged students to pursue careers in less lucra-
tive but highly valued professions. A grant program would create a
wondrous incentive: the more a student borrows, and the more school-
ing that student obtains, the greater the financial benefit, in the form of
repayment assistance, that would flow from working in the public in-
terest after graduation.
4. A Better Rationale for Special Bankruptcy Treatment
Allowing students to borrow more through federal aid programs
would not change how the Bankruptcy Code deals with educational
debt. But the treatment of student loans in bankruptcy is not the big-
gest hurdle to students seeking to enroll in college. There is a rationale
for making it difficult for borrowers to cancel federal student loans
through bankruptcy, too, because those loans are taxpayer-
subsidized.239
Private loans are not taxpayer subsidized, though, in that Con-
gress does not set interest rates on those obligations. While legislation
to eliminate the special treatment of private student loans in bank-
ruptcy proceedings has been proposed in both houses of Congress, as
of September 2010, it was approved only by a subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee.240
239. In a sense, here, “bankruptcy policy becomes an indirect lever for education
policy,” in that the more difficult it is to discharge these loans, the less the govern-
ment must either pay in the way of insurance to lenders in the guaranteed loan pro-
gram or absorb as losses in the direct loan program, and the more money is available
to fund aid to other students. John A. E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student
Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS.
L. J. 245, 261 (2006). Pottow finds this one of the more compelling explanations of
special treatment of student loans in bankruptcy.
240. Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2010, H.R. 5043, 111th Cong.
§ 2 (2010).
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B. The Risks
This proposal is likely to raise several legitimate concerns. First,
loans made by the federal government put taxpayers at risk in the
event of borrower default; the larger the sums borrowed, the greater
the potential exposure. Second, college and university administrators
may react to greater availability of funds for students by raising tuition
and fees. Third, greater availability of federal loans is a boon to the
for-profit education sector. This is a potential concern because stu-
dents who enroll in these programs may have fewer high-quality em-
ployment opportunities than students graduating from other types of
institutions.241 Fourth, allowing students to borrow more could mean
that graduates’ overall debt burdens will swell rather than shrink. I
address each of these criticisms in turn.
1. Taxpayer Impact
Measures of current rates of default on student loans do not offer
much guidance in predicting the impact of either a sharp increase in
maximum loan amounts available to student borrowers or a system of
reversible grants.242 However, the important goal here is not to push
more graduates into jobs that contribute to the public good, but rather
to enable students who wish to enter such jobs to do so. For other
students, the grants become loans, and they graduate in the same posi-
tion they would be under the current system—but without obligations
to private lenders.
241. Indeed, for-profit educational institutions in 2010 have battled regulations pro-
posed by the Department of Education that would curtail the availability of federal
loans to institutions whose graduates do not find gainful employment. The proposed
rule would apply “a two-part test: measuring the relationship between the debt stu-
dents incur and their incomes after program completion; and measuring the rate at
which all enrollees, regardless of completion, repay their loans on time.” Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Proposed Rule Links Federal Student Aid to Loan Repay-
ment Rates and Debt-to-Earnings Levels for Career College Graduates, (July 23,
2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/proposed-rule-links-fed-
eral-student-aid-loan-repayment-rates-and-debt-earnings. A final version of the rule is
scheduled to be released in early 2011. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Depart-
ment on Track to Implement Gainful Employment Regulations; New Schedule Pro-
vides Additional Time to Consider Extensive Public Input (Sept. 24, 2010), available
at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-track-implement-gainful-em-
ployment-regulations-new-schedule-provides-.
242. Estimating the fiscal impact of loan repayment assistance for borrowers who
enter public service is yet more challenging. The repayment assistance program is
new, but even if information on cost were easily ascertainable, it would be difficult to
weigh the tangible cost of repayment assistance against the intangible benefit of en-
couraging more young college graduates to pursue public service jobs.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\14-1dr\nyl102.txt unknown Seq: 53 10-MAR-11 14:54
2011] THE OTHER BIG TEST 63
Depending on interest rates, the federal government can make
money off student loans. As long as the government’s cost of funds—
the interest it pays on its own debt—is less than the rate charged to
student borrowers, then the government gains financially, and that
money can be used to fund more loans, forgiveness and/or repayment
assistance, or make up for defaults.
Although it is difficult to predict whether allowing borrowers ac-
cess to larger amounts of money from federal sources will make de-
faults more frequent than is currently the case, even if default rates
hold steady, it is likely that, with larger loan balances per borrower,
the average cost of each default to taxpayers will increase.
One reason forecasts are difficult is the scarcity of data. The gov-
ernment does not adequately track how many students default on their
federal loan repayment obligations. While the Department of Educa-
tion publishes a report every year on a “cohort default rate,” that rate
has been based on how many students default during the first two
years of repayment. The 2008 official cohort default rate, the most
recent available, was seven percent, an increase from 6.7% the previ-
ous year.243 Default is defined as failure to pay for 270 days.244 Bor-
rowers typically must begin repaying loans six months after
graduation. In combination, these two characteristics of repayment
mean that a borrower could make payments for less than half of the
two-year period under consideration245 and still not count toward the
relevant cohort default rate.
This method of tracking default does not accurately reflect how
often the government must either make good on a guaranteed loan or
absorb a loss on a direct loan. A study that followed federal student
loan borrowers over a ten-year period—the standard repayment term
for the loans—found that, on average, borrowers defaulted 3.9
243. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Loan Default Rates Increase, (Sept.
13, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/student-loan-default-
rates-increase-0.
244. Important Terms, FUNDING EDUC. BEYOND HIGH SCHOOL,U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/students/publications/student_guide/2009-2010/english/im-
portantterms.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
245. Consider a hypothetical student graduating in June 2009. That student would
begin making payments six months later, in December 2009. If she stopped making
payments as early as October 2010—less than 270 days (nine months) before the
second anniversary of her graduation in June 2011—her default would not count to-
ward the default rate for the class of 2009, although she would have made monthly
payments for only eleven months.
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years246 after graduation, putting them well outside the two-year win-
dow used by the Department of Education. The study also found that
9.7% of borrowers defaulted,247 a rate considerably higher than the
two-year cohort default rate.
The average loan balance among 1993 bachelor’s degree recipi-
ents who defaulted over the next decade was $10,000, just $2,400
more than the average balance among borrowers who did not de-
fault.248 The more students borrowed, the higher the rates of default:
among borrowers with $15,000 or more in student loans, nearly
twenty percent defaulted.249 This last finding is reason to worry that
allowing students to borrow more may lead to more frequent defaults,
but it should be considered in light of another finding in the report: of
those borrowers who defaulted, 44.5% resumed making payments.250
Additionally, the cohort under study did not have the advantage of
access to current versions of income-based repayment or repayment
assistance for those pursuing public interest careers. It is hard to know
how much difference those interventions might have made.
The ten-year study raises the question of why the government has
used a two-year window to measure default rates. As it turns out, the
short time horizon benefits two groups: loan companies and the col-
leges and universities that receive lenders’ money. The lower the de-
fault rate in the guaranteed loan program, the easier it was for lenders
to argue for their role in the federal aid system. Separately, because
federal loan program rules require participating institutions to keep
default rates down, any step that lowers the measured default rate pre-
serves eligibility for more institutions.251
The longer the time horizon used to evaluate student loan repay-
ment, the higher the likely resulting cost of defaults. Congress has
approved a shift to measuring the default rate over a three-year period
following graduation.252 Early evidence suggests this move will result
246. SUSAN P. CHOY ET AL. , NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DEALING WITH






251. Currently, institutions that participate in federal loan programs must keep their
default rates below forty percent. Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html#
table (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
252. William Taggart, Release of Trial Three-Year Cohort Default Rates, U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC. (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/1207
09RelTrialThreeYearCohortDefaultRates.html.
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in dramatically higher reported default rates.253 In 2007, 0.4% of
Harvard University graduates defaulted under the two-year definition,
but the percentage would double under the three-year version.254 Such
a rate is far below the national average and likely reflects the success
of Harvard graduates, but the change produced by a shift in definition
is striking. Consider what happens at a less selective institution, such
as the University of Phoenix, a for-profit school, where the default rate
rises from 9.3% to 15.9% with the change in definition.255 At the
Fresno, California campus of Heald College, another for-profit institu-
tion, it rises from 16% to 28%.256 At Diablo Valley College, a two-
year, public institution, the default rate rises from 5.2% to 13.1%.257
The increases raise disturbing questions about how well some institu-
tions’ educational programs serve students, an issue addressed in more
detail below.
Student loan defaults likely result from a variety of factors in the
lives of borrowers, of which the amount borrowed is one significant
element. As a practical response to fears of ballooning taxpayer liabil-
ity for defaulted student loans, in the short term, Congress could lift
maximum loan amounts for a limited number of colleges and universi-
ties of various types. Running such a pilot program for several years
would provide invaluable information about actual default rates over
the lifetime of loans.258
It may be that a wisely designed loan program could forestall
default by limiting the educational institutions that federal loan bor-
rowers could attend or imposing other requirements on both students
and colleges. Monitoring the experiences of borrowers in a pilot pro-
gram would help identify criteria that would ensure that loan funds are
not wasted. Additionally, a pilot program would likely draw less polit-
ical opposition than an immediate expansion of federal aid programs.
253. Trial Three-Year Cohort Default Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://federalstu-





258. It is important to note here that I do not propose elimination of the tough stan-
dard imposed on borrowers seeking to discharge federal student loans through bank-
ruptcy. That high hurdle, forcing borrowers in many and perhaps most cases to repay
all or most of their government-subsidized student loan obligations, may help to keep
the cost of defaults down over the long run.
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2. Will College Costs Soar Higher?
The cost of higher education has risen for decades and for years
has outpaced growth in income.259 If college administrators know that
students’ borrowing options have expanded, some might raise prices
further, capturing in the present the future income against which stu-
dents borrow. One critic of the current system, Andrew Gillen, con-
tends that “current financial aid practices contribute to. . . [an] arms
race in spending [by colleges and universities], which leads to higher
costs.”260 In his view, colleges raise prices in order to invest in offer-
ings that lure students, and the higher prices make higher education
less affordable.261
Gillen’s argument suggests that somehow, scarcity of credit has
constrained tuition hikes by colleges and universities—a questionable
assertion. Given how colleges’ prices cluster around each other, the
only current, evident constraint on tuition appears to be a desire not to
be too much of an outlier.262 Greater availability of loans might rea-
sonably be expected to lead to greater demand for higher education.
Higher demand in turn might be expected to result in a higher price,
but the rules of the market for education are not clear-cut. College
administrators say the cost of the education provided already exceeds,
in some cases significantly, the price charged; the normal rules of eco-
nomics do not apply.263
Empirical studies of changes in tuition do not support the asser-
tion that colleges raise prices in response to greater perceived availa-
bility of funds to students.264 A 2001 study of college costs and prices
259. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. R
260. ANDREW GILLEN, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY, FINAN-
CIAL AID IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY IT IS INEFFECTIVE AND WHAT CAN BE
DONE ABOUT IT 6 (2009), http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/Fi-
nancial_Aid_in_Theory_and_Practice(1).pdf.
261. Id. at 27 (warning that “if loans are too widely available, they can contribute to
the arms race which drives up costs and in turn tuition, and therefore reduces
affordability”).
262. See Glater & Finder, supra note 145 (“In setting tuition, Notre Dame watches R
20 other colleges and universities, including the University of Chicago, Emory and
Vanderbilt. ‘We’re setting it by our competitors,’ said the Rev. John I. Jenkins, the
institution’s president.”).
263. See id. (noting that Swarthmore College “spends about $73,690 a student. But
its tuition, room, board and fees in the last academic year were little more than
$41,000”).
264. See ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, STUDY
OF COLLEGE COSTS AND PRICES, 1988–89 TO 1997–98, 101 (2001), http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2002/2002157.pdf (reviewing studies of the impact of financial aid on pricing
and observing that “[r]esearch on the possible relationship of federal loan aid to prices
has been even less conclusive [than on the relationship of grant aid to prices], sug-
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identified associations between tuition and a variety of variables, in-
cluding the percentage of students receiving student loans.265 But the
study did not find a relationship between student loan volume and
tuition.266 Determining how relationships involving loans, grant aid,
and tuition work is challenging because each factor affects the others.
Even if tuition goes up with greater federal loan amounts availa-
ble, the price increases could actually enable more low-income stu-
dents to afford to enroll, as a result of the strange workings of
financial aid. Rising tuition can promote access to higher education—
in fact, one study suggests that rising tuition may be a sign of an edu-
cational institution’s efforts to accommodate more lower-income stu-
dents.267 The more revenue colleges take in from students, the more
money they have available to extend in the form of aid to those who
need it.268
More generous financial aid, including greater institution-pro-
vided grant aid, helps correct the inequality-fostering effects of
loans,269 which otherwise result in larger debts for graduates whose
families are of more modest means.270 This high-cost, high-aid model
gesting that if such a relationship exists, it may be indirect”). The authors’ analysis
“found no associations between most of the aid packaging variables and the change in
tuition.” Id. at 119.
265. Id. at 105. However, the study suffered because it used data from a single point
in time rather than tracking variables over an extended period. Id. at 109.
266. Id. at 133.
267. Id. at 104. Gillen attacks this practice as “price discrimination”: charging differ-
ent customers different prices for the same service, because the different customers
have different abilities to pay. Gillen contends that a so-called high-cost, high-aid
strategy does not lead to greater enrollment of lower income students. GILLEN, supra
note 260, at 11, 29. R
268. Ian Ayres has forcefully articulated the view that charging higher tuition at pub-
lic universities in particular can be positive because keeping prices low benefits the
wealthy, while providing less financial aid hurts poorer students. “Tuition increases
are actually a good idea—as long as they are matched with financial aid, including
scholarships, for poor students.” Ian Ayres, Why California’s Tuition Hike Might Be a
Good Thing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2009, 2:25 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.ny-
times.com/2009/11/23/why-californias-tuition-hike-might-be-a-good-thing/.
269. However, the wealthiest colleges have dramatically expanded their financial aid
offerings to students from relatively wealthy families, too, in some cases offering
assistance even to those whose families make $200,000 per year. See, e.g., Karen W.
Arenson, Yale Plans Sharp Increase in Student Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at
A14; Jonathan D. Glater, Stanford Set to Raise Aid for Students in Middle, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at A14; Sara Rimer & Alan Finder, Harvard Steps up Financial
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A1. Most colleges, of course, cannot afford such
generosity to the upper classes.
270. Financial aid officials at colleges defend the current system, arguing that it
makes it possible for more poor students to attend. In essence, wealthy students and
their families pay the sticker price while poorer students pay a discounted price. The
College Board has estimated that the average “net price” of an undergraduate educa-
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may not be the ideal scheme for improving access to higher education,
but the combination of high tuition and generous financial aid does
undermine the argument that rising sticker prices serve to exclude the
less wealthy from institutions of higher education.
3. Why Help For-Profit Providers of Higher Education?
Concern about the role of for-profit higher education companies
may pose the most difficult challenge to an expansion of federal aid.
Currently, for-profit companies that sell higher education are huge
beneficiaries of federal loan programs. The College Board estimates
that eighty-eight percent of students enrolled at for-profit colleges take
out federal loans, compared to forty-two percent of public university
students and fifty-five percent of private, nonprofit college students.271
Even though relatively few students—just one in fourteen272—attend
for-profit colleges, such institutions receive one-fourth of all federal
education dollars.273 And students at for-profit institutions take out
private loans more often than do students enrolled in other educational
programs, too.274
Reliance on federal loans would be less troubling, but for the data
on rates of completion of degree programs by students enrolled in for-
profit institutions. Just twenty-five percent of students enrolled at for-
profit colleges obtain a bachelor’s degree within six years, compared
to sixty-four percent at private nonprofit colleges and fifty-five
percent at public universities.275 Loan default rates are higher at
for-profit institutions: in 2007, 21.2% of students who took out fed-
eral loans to attend for-profit colleges defaulted within three years,
nearly double the 11.8% rate for all borrowers.276 Forty-four per-
tion at private, nonprofit, four-year colleges is nearly $16,000 less than the average
published sticker price of $27,290 in tuition and fees. See TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRIC-
ING, supra note 39, at 15, fig. 7. R
271. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2009, supra note 2, at 8. R
272. Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trusts, New Default Rate Data for Federal
Student Loans: 44% of Defaulters Attended For-Profit Institutions (Dec. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=56473.
273. 156 CONG. REC. S7589 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
274. See THE PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT, supra note 236, at 1 (analyzing data from R
the Department of Education showing that in 2007–08, forty-two percent of students
at for-profit educational institutions had taken out private loans; at private, nonprofit
schools, twenty-five percent of students had taken out private loans; and at public,
four-year schools, just fourteen percent had done so).
275. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT EFFORT
AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 73 fig.21–1, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2010/pdf/
21_2010.pdf.
276. Mark Kantrowitz, Cohort Default Rates, FINAID.ORG, http://www.finaid.org/
loans/cohortdefaultrates.phtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\14-1dr\nyl102.txt unknown Seq: 59 10-MAR-11 14:54
2011] THE OTHER BIG TEST 69
cent of all students who borrowed to attend for-profit institutions
defaulted.277
The completion and default rate statistics for the for-profit sector
are more disturbing, in light of the characteristics of students who en-
roll at for-profit colleges. More than fifty-three percent of students at
for-profit schools receive Pell grants,278 federal grants available to the
neediest students. In contrast, Pell grant recipients make up just thirty-
one percent of students at public and private, non-profit institutions.
For-profit institutions claim that they enroll large numbers of minority
students.279
These statistics do not mean that all for-profit education pro-
grams do not serve the interests of students. Nor do they mean that
such programs should be barred from participation in federal loan pro-
grams, although they do suggest that the for-profit sector merits addi-
tional study to ensure that students who attend them are well-served
by the experience. Measures of efficacy other than debt burden should
determine the extent of government support of higher education op-
portunities in the for-profit sector and beyond.
In the summer of 2010, the Department of Education proposed
rules that would impose tough standards on for-profit educational in-
stitutions. In order to ensure that their students could receive federal
student aid, for-profit schools would have to prove that their educa-
tional programs prepared students for “gainful employment” by dem-
onstrating that at least forty-five percent of their former students were
paying down principal on their student loans or that their graduates
had a debt-to-income ratio of less than twenty percent of their discre-
tionary income or eight percent of total income.280
277. New Default Rate Data for Federal Student Loans, supra note 272. Further, the R
Department of Education reported that “[t]here are 18 . . . [federal] loan defaults for
every 100 graduates of for-profit institutions, compared to only 5 . . . [federal] loan
defaults for every 100 graduates of public institutions.” Program Integrity: Gainful
Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 43,618 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pt. 668). However, all these figures do not make clear whether students who are more
financially vulnerable become victims of poor educational programs and then default,
or whether students of lesser means are more likely to fail to complete programs of
study and/or default on debts regardless of the institution attended.
278. Table 343: Percentage of Full-Time and Part-Time Undergraduates Receiving
Federal Aid, by Aid Program and Control and Type of Institution: 2003–04, NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/di-
gest/d08/tables/dt08_343.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
279. See, e.g., CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC., 100,000 STUDENTS DON’T COUNT?, http://
mycareercounts.org/MyCareerCounts_AdCampaign.pdf.
280. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,618. The Depart-
ment of Education also summarized the requirements. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Proposed Rule Links Federal Student Aid to Loan Repayment Rates and Debt-
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In order to be eligible to participate in federal aid programs, col-
leges (for profit or otherwise) must keep their default rates below a
certain threshold. It is clear that for-profit colleges should raise com-
pletion rates and lower default rates,281 regardless of whether federal
aid programs expand or remain unchanged. Poor outcomes282 at for-
profit schools do not mean overall federal lending should not expand;
indeed, if federal programs were expanded, more federal loan money
might at least lead to a decrease in the number of students at for-profit
schools who are saddled with private loan debts.
For-profit colleges’ response to student loan market turmoil
caused by the financial crisis of 2008 suggests one possible solution to
explore. Some colleges began extending loans to students themselves
when those students could no longer obtain private loans.283 If for-
profit colleges with lower completion rates and higher loan default
rates were required to extend loans themselves—alongside federal
aid—that exposure could encourage the colleges to work harder to
ensure that students pay their obligations. Colleges could invest more
in job placement services or work harder to discourage students from
taking on more debt than their chosen career could support. This is not
to-Earnings Levels for Career College Graduates (July 23, 2010), available at http://
www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/proposed-rule-links-federal-student-aid-loan-repay-
ment-rates-and-debt-earnings. For-profit colleges opposed the regulation. Goldie
Blumenstyk, Education Dep’t to Delay Issuing ‘Gainful Employment’ Rules Opposed
by For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 24, 2010, http://chronicle.
com/article/Education-Dept-to-Delay/124617/ (“The [proposed] rule, which is being
vehemently opposed by the for-profit college industry and its allies and backed by a
coalition of consumer and education groups, could eliminate federal financial aid for
programs where high proportions of students are not repaying the principle [sic] on
their student loans or end up with excessive debt loads for the salaries they can
earn.”).
281. Colleges and universities, public or private, have an incentive to keep their de-
fault rates down in order to maintain eligibility for federal student aid. Students may
not use federal aid to attend schools that either (1) have default rates of twenty-five
percent or greater for three years or more or (2) have default rates of forty percent or
greater for one year. Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools: Definitions, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/definitions.
html#loss25 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
282. The debate over the outcomes experienced by students who attend for-profit
institutions has already begun over the 2010 regulatory proposal by the Department of
Education. The Career College Association, whose membership includes for-profit
educational institutions, has opposed the proposed rules. See, e.g., Career College
Association Says ED Gainful Employment Proposal Imperils over 2 Million Students
in Next Decade, ASS’N OF PRIVATE SECTOR COLLS. AND UNIVS., http://www.career.
org/iMISPublic/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDis-
play.cfm&CONTENTID=21196 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
283. Jonathan D. Glater, As Lending Tightens, Education Could Suffer, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2008, at C1.
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an ideal solution, and for-profit education providers might resist it be-
cause their shareholders likely would not want to take on the financial
risk that extending credit to students entails.
4. Some Debts Are Worse than Others
It is inevitable that raising available loan amounts will lead to
greater federal indebtedness among student borrowers who do not pur-
sue public interest careers. To the extent that debt, by its very nature,
is undesirable, then enlarging the federal loan program is undesirable,
too. However, allowing students to take out larger loans would not
occur in a vacuum. Students are already borrowing ever larger
amounts, in the form of private loans. The goal of increasing federal
options is the substitution of federal loans for private loans, rather than
putting heavier debt burdens on students. I hope and expect that in-
creasing the availability of federal loans would have primarily a sub-
stitution effect. My proposal recognizes that, while all debts may be
undesirable, they are not equally so.
For borrowers, federal loans offer clear benefits over private
loans, even though discharge of either type of debt through bankruptcy
currently faces high hurdles.284 Federal loan programs have more gen-
erous repayment plans and deferral options for students experiencing
economic hardship. They also offer the income-based repayment op-
tions described previously. Perhaps most importantly, federal repay-
ment assistance programs would cover additional borrowing through
direct loan programs. If repayment assistance aims to make public ser-
vice more attractive to students, regardless of socioeconomic back-
ground and debt level, federal aid programs should be expanded so
that more students can take advantage of federal programs that help
students pay off their debts.
CONCLUSION
The student loan scandals of 2007 raised a fundamental question
about the way we pay, collectively and individually, for higher educa-
tion in the United States. For years, the retail price of undergraduate
tuition has outstripped most households’ ability to pay. This trend,
which shows few signs of slowing, has led to dramatic growth in the
student loan industry.285 The money at stake in turn led to the adop-
tion of questionable marketing tactics by lenders.
284. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. R
285. According to the College Board, between the 1997–98 and the 2007–08 aca-
demic years federal loan volume grew by 70%, rising to $66.8 billion from $39.3
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The legislative and regulatory responses to loan industry scandals
have not gone far enough in facilitating access to higher education.
For example, slightly more information about the terms of private
loans does not eliminate the need for those loans.286 In this article, I
have argued that lawmakers should both toughen regulation of compa-
nies that make private student loans and increase the amount available
through federal loan programs. The goal is to promote access to higher
education, protect students from unnecessary debt with harsher terms,
and enhance the effectiveness of loan repayment assistance programs
intended to enable graduates to take jobs in the public interest. While
raising maximum federal loan amounts may seem a counterintuitive
remedy, doing so would have far-reaching positive effects. For these
reasons, political attacks on an effort to provide funding for higher
education for more students on better terms would be fraught with
risk, even for the skilled and powerful lender lobby.
Correctly designed, an expanded federal loan program could
move college, graduate, and professional school into the realm of pos-
sibility for students who otherwise might think such opportunities
were unavailable to them. It would reduce the need for private loans,
which have terms that are less favorable to borrowers. It would pave
the way for eventual domination of student lending by the federal di-
rect loan program, which could end up making money for taxpayers in
the form of interest payments by borrowers.
This proposal is straightforward but resolves a very complicated
set of problems; in the current political and economic climate, it has
good odds of success. Supplementing the disclosure provisions in leg-
islation passed in response to past scandals would not achieve as
much. Greater disclosure would not overcome borrowers’ lack of so-
phistication about credit and would not create additional borrowing
alternatives for students and families facing total college costs that
rival or exceed the price of a house. While any effort to impose addi-
tional disclosure requirements would almost certainly draw criticism
billion. Private loan volume over the same period grew far more—592%—but from a
smaller base, rising to $17.6 billion from $2.5 billion. See COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS
IN STUDENT AID 6 (2008), http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/
trends-in-student-aid-2008.pdf). The increase in private loan volume reflects the
growing importance of private loans to supplement federal borrowing options, which
have not kept pace with tuition increases.
286. In the same vein, raising the amounts that students can borrow through federal
loan programs—thereby avoiding private loans—does not address the deeper problem
of rising student indebtedness. Only in conjunction with federal loan forgiveness and
income-contingent repayment programs does the shift address the larger debt
problem.
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from lenders, who have benefitted from historically lax oversight,287
political attacks on an effort to provide funding for higher education
for more students on better terms would be fraught with risk, even for
the skilled and powerful lender lobby.
Additional disclosure requirements would also fail to protect
those private loan borrowers whose educational experience yields lit-
tle in the way of professional advancement. Students who take on sig-
nificant private loan debt, but then do not find employment paying
sufficiently high wages, will have a difficult time honoring their loan
obligations. Many lower-income students using private loans attend
for-profit institutions with poorer records of job placement and loan
repayment. Such a situation, in which poorer students end up carrying
larger debts and facing difficulty in repayment, should not be permit-
ted to continue. Federal loan programs offer more flexibility in repay-
ment, allowing for adjustment of repayment amounts based on
income, for example.
The question of how to help students pay for higher education is
pressing. In recent legislation, Congress made a major change in the
manner in which federal student loans are provided. Whether
lawmakers are prepared to wade further into higher education finance
will be a test of their leadership. In an ever more global marketplace,
however, the United States must work to promote access to higher
education in order to protect its position and its citizens’ quality of
life. At the practical level, those who have invested in higher educa-
tion historically have earned higher incomes; at the more abstract
level, a more educated polity is, as Jefferson observed,288 better able
to recognize and resist potential tyranny. Lawmakers should therefore
endeavor to keep higher education within the financial reach of those
students who seek it.
287. See Glater & Arenson, supra note 124 (reporting that loan companies “bene- R
fited from oversight so lax that the Department of Education’s assistant inspector
general in 2003 called for tightened regulation of lender dealings with universities”);
see also A Closer Look: Inspectors General Address Waste, Fraud, Abuse in Federal
Mandatory Programs: Hearing before the H. Budget Comm., 108th Cong. 78 (2003)
(statement of John P. Higgins, Jr., Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Educ.), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:
88288.pdf (“The Department needs to increase its monitoring of schools, lenders,
guaranty agencies, and other participants in these programs . . . . Our audits have
repeatedly cited deficiencies in the Department’s oversight of schools, including a
significant decrease in program reviews and inconsistent enforcement of financial
responsibility.”).
288. See Jefferson, supra note 6. R
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